



Across four decades, the concept of animus has emerged from equal
protection doctrine as an independent constitutional force. In four
decisions-an animus quadrilogy-the Supreme Court has struck
down state and federal acts that it concluded were driven by animus
toward a group of people.' The roots of anti-animus doctrine go
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even deeper, reaching back to political-process concerns famously
articulated more than seventy years ago in United States v Carolene
Products about how "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
. . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."2 Asa
matter of constitutional law, a legislative process impelled by animus
is a poisoned and poisonous one.
Nevertheless, the constitutional anti-animus principle remains an
unappreciated one. There is little consensus about what animus is;
about whether, why, and when it is constitutionally problematic; or
about what the appropriate role of courts, if any, should be in po-
licing it. The decisions of lower courts have been wary of relying
on animus.' Scholars have tended to discount the doctrine.' Beyond
Constitution, like the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom, Locke v Davey,
540 US 712, 725 (2004) ("animus" against religion would be grounds to invalidate a law
under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause), and the Constitution's clauses for-
bidding federal and state Bills of Attainder, see US Const, Art I, § 9, and US Const, Art
I, § 10, which prevent legislatures from declaring a person guilty of a crime and stripping
him of all procedural rights.
I United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938) (emphasis added).
See also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review 76 (Harvard,
1980) (the Court should "concern itself with what majorities do to minorities").
I The first district court post- Windsor to invalidate a state ban on same-sex marriage
declined to rely on the anti-animus principle because, the judge determined, "the Supreme
Court has not yet delineated the contours of such an approach." Kitchen v Herbert, 2013
WL 6697874, *21 (D Utah). In all, within eight months after Windsor came down, seven
district courts held that state marriage laws were at least in part unconstitutional, but none
rested squarely on animus grounds. See De Leon v Perry, 2014 WL 715741, *1 (WD Tex)
(state law denied same-sex couples their fundamental right to marry and equal protection);
Lee v Orr, 2014 WL 683680, *1 (ND Ill) (holding based on fundamental right to marry
and equal protection); Bourke v Beshear, 2014 WL 556729, *7 (WD Ky) ("Absent a clear
showing of animus, however, the Court must still search for any rational relation to a
legitimate government purpose," and then striking down state's nonrecognition of valid
same-sex marriages from out of state as lacking a rational basis); Bostic v Rainey, 2014 WL
561978, *1, *21 (ED Va) (asserting that bans on same-sex marriage were "rooted in unlawful
prejudice" but concluding that the laws lacked a rational basis); Bishop v United States,
2014 WL 116013, *21-23, *33 (ND Okla) (state marriage law was enacted for the purpose
of excluding same-sex couples and failed rational-basis test); Kitchen v Herbert, 2013 WL
6697874 (D Utah) (rational-basis review); and Obergefell v Wymyslo, 2013 WL 7869139,
*20-21 (SD Ohio). The district court decision in Obergefell came closest to relying upon
animus. "A review of the historical background and legislative history of the Ohio laws
at issue," said the court, "leads to the [] conclusion ... that in refusing to recognize a
particular type of legal out-of-state marriagesfor the first time in its history, Ohio is engaging
in 'discrimination[] of an unusual character' without a rational basis for doing so." Id at
*19.
* For scholarly treatments of the concept of animus in constitutional law, see Steven
Douglas Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, UC Davis L Rev (forthcoming, 2014);
Andrew M. Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn DOMA (Northwestern




uncertainty, there is strong criticism. One critique is that the doc-
trine is analytically empty, a conclusion clothed in argument. An-
other is that it calls for the kind of unprincipled judgment about
subjective legislative motivation that has long been discredited in
jurisprudence. A third holds that slapping the animus label on a
law is an attempt to hush debate about deeply contested moral and
legal controversies. On this view, it insults those who differ from
the Court's majority, dismissing them as bigots-a form of consti-
tutional name-calling. Perhaps animus doctrine is animus based.
Yet consider the simple idea that it is wrong for one person to
treat another person malevolently. This sentiment so suffuses our
moral and legal tradition that hardly anyone would deny it. "Of
course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human
being or class of human beings," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in
his dissent in Romer v Evans.' Animus doctrine constitutionalizes
this basic precept. It asserts that just as individuals have a moral and
sometimes legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group
of people elected as representatives (or acting in some other official
governmental capacity) in a liberal democracy has a moral and
sometimes constitutional duty not to act maliciously toward a per-
son or group of people.'
Under the anti-animus principle, the Constitution's Equal Pro-
tection guarantee is understood to "guard one part of the society
Daniel 0. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 Ind L J 27 (Winter
2014); Susannah W Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 Fordham L Rev 887 (2012);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements of Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich L Rev 2062 (2002); Elizabeth S. Anderson and
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U Pa L Rev 1503
(2000); Barbara J. Flagg, "Animus" and Moral Disapproval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans,
82 Minn L Rev 833 (1998); J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L J 2313
(1997); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal L Rev 297
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4 (1996).
s 517 US 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J, dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to suggest a
distinction between hatred of a person and disapproval of his conduct: "But I had thought
that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy,
or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct. Surely that
is the only sort of 'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct ... "
Id. Whatever remained of the status-conduct distinction in reference to homosexuality
collapsed in Lawrence v Texas, in which, as Justice Scalia put it, the Court held that "the
promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest." 539 US
558, 599 (2003) (Scalia,J, dissenting). This holding was confirmed in Christian Legal Society
v Martinez, in which the Court declared that it would not distinguish between homosexual
status and conduct-the one is intimately linked to the other. 130 S Ct 2971, 2990 (2010).
6 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 157 (cited in note 2) ("To disadvantage a group essentially
out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern and respect, specifically by
valuing their welfare negatively.").
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against the injustice of the other part"' by checking the tendency
of legislative majorities to be vindictive. The anti-animus doctrine
addresses this systemic problem by scrutinizing the reasons for gov-
ernment action. The government acts on animus when, to a material
degree, it aims "to disparage and to injure" a person or group ofpeople.'
The injury may be tangible, as in the denial of benefits and pro-
tections a group would have in the absence of animus against them.
Or the injury may be intangible, as in the affront to their dignity
and to the respect they deserve as equal citizens, which may be
caused by their exclusion from a status they would have absent
animus against them. The desire simply to reward and encourage
socially beneficial behavior by one group is not by itself animus
toward another group.' But the simple desire to harm (in a tangible
and/or intangible way) one group of people is unconstitutional an-
imus. If animus was present, moreover, it taints the law. The act is
unconstitutional even if legitimate reasons might now be offered
to justify it.'o
Carolene Products would correctly predict that the targets of an-
imus will almost always be politically unpopular minorities. Yet the
anti-animus doctrine does not specify, as would formal heightened
scrutiny, certain classifications that are subjected to special judicial
scrutiny. It doesn't favor certain vulnerable classes. All citizens are
protected from animus-based government action." That is their
minimal entitlement as citizens of a liberal democracy dedicated to
the equal protection of the laws.
In constitutional law, the concern about animus was born in a
7 Federalist 51 (Madison) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist Papers 347 (Wesleyan,
1961).
" Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2696.
9 Whether animus is what actually drove government decision making when the gov-
ernment claims the benign purpose simply to encourage good conduct depends on con-
sideration of a variety of objective factors outlined below in the introduction and in Section
ll.A.
1o This raises the prospect, dreaded by some, that a law enacted for an impermissible
animus-based purpose might later be reenacted for a legitimate purpose and subsequently
upheld. For a response to this criticism of purpose inquiry in constitutional law, see Section
I.C.3.
" A similar idea is described as the "pariah principle" by Dan Farber and Suzanna
Sherry: "This principle, in a nutshell, forbids the government from designating any societal
group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group in question is generally entitled
to some special degree of judicial protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like
left-handers (or, under current doctrine, homosexuals)." Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry,
The Pariah Principle, 13 Const Comm 257, 258 (1996).
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time when government often acted for the purpose of harming racial
minorities. The law reacted by subjecting all racial classifications
to special judicial scrutiny, regardless of what motive the govern-
ment might actually have had. But anti-animus principles have been
sharpened and crystallized in response to the law's almost unre-
lenting hostility toward gay men and lesbians. For most of American
history, public policy toward homosexuals was marked by fear and
disgust. Homosexuals were seen as dirty, diseased, and dangerous.
As a result of the long-standing mistreatment of this small minority,
the Supreme Court has been schooled on the many ways that a
legislative body might target a group of people for insult or injury
and be literally thoughtless about their interests. For a Court un-
willing to take the extraordinary step of invalidating all anti-gay
legislation, the anti-animus doctrine offered a framework under
which the most egregious official expressions of malice toward gays
would be invalidated.
The animus quadrilogy overlaps a gay-rights trilogy that has
charted the remarkable rise of respect for the dignity and rights of
homosexuals. On May 20, 1996, just as Congress was beginning
the process of passing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to
ban any federal recognition of then-nonexistent same-sex mar-
riages,12 justice Scalia cut to the heart of the question of homo-
sexuality and the Constitution in his dissent in Romer. He asked,
incredulously: is "the perceived social harm of homosexuality" no
longer a "legitimate concern of government"?" Striking down a
state constitutional amendment barring specific protections from
anti-gay discrimination, the Court answered "yes" by concluding
that Amendment 2 reflected impermissible animus against homo-
sexuals." In 2003 the Court confirmed the answer in Lawrence v
Texas," striking down a state "Homosexual Conduct" law because
the state cannot "demean [the] existence" of homosexuals. It rejected
the state interest in expressing moral disapproval of homosexuality. 6
Then came United States v Windsor," striking down DOMA because
" Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996).
" Romer, 517 US at 651 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
1 Id at 635-36.
539 US 558 (2003).
6 Id at 564, 578 (2003).
"7 133 S Ct 2675, 2693 (2013). When I refer in this article to "DOMA" I mean that
as shorthand only for Section 3 of DOMA, the federal definition of marriage. I do not
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the Court thought that by denying any federal recognition to oth-
erwise valid same-sex marriages Congress exhibited animus against
the targeted couples and their children.
These three momentous decisions involving gay rights cumula-
tively make it clear that the perceived social harm of homosexuality,
along with simple moral disapproval of it, is no longer a proper
basis on which to carve out gay people from legal protection. It is
unconstitutional animus for the government to target homosexuals
simply because it morally disapproves of homosexuality." There
must be some reasoned public-policy purpose beyond moral dis-
approval if state-imposed restrictions on gays are to survive anti-
animus review."
Windsor refined and enlarged the concept of unconstitutional an-
imus. The decision contains three conclusions of significance for
constitutional law generally and for the rights of gay men and les-
bians specifically. First, in what we might call the conclusion of
principle in Windsor, the opinion confirmed that legislation driven
mean to refer to Section 2, which purported to allow the states to disregard otherwise
valid same-sex marriages from outside the state. The constitutional analysis of Section 2
would involve different considerations and justifications, like a claimed desire to prevent
the "nationalization" of same-sex marriage after a single state like Hawaii recognized it.
Whether Section 2 might also be unconstitutional on animus (or other constitutional)
grounds is beyond the scope of the article.
" "[T]he desire to effectuate one's animus against homosexuals can never be a legitimate
governmental purpose, [and] a state action based on that animus alone violates the Equal
Protection Clause." Davis v Prison Health Services, 679 F3d 433, 438 (6th Cir 2012), quoting
Stemler v City of Florence, 126 F3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir 1997). In Davis a state employee
claimed that "the public-works officers supervising his work crew treated him differently
than other inmates, ridiculed and belittled him, and 'ma[d]e a spectacle' of him when they
brought him back to the correctional facility after a public-works assignment because of
his sexual orientation." Id at 436. He also claimed that "these officers did not want to
strip search him because he was homosexual and would make 'under the breath' remarks
when selected to do so." Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that, if true, the allegations were
sufficient to find "that the officers' actions toward him were motivated by an anti-gay
animus." Id at 438.
" The anti-animus principle is not solely concerned with protecting gay men and les-
bians from malice. As discussed below, see Section II, it has also been used to strike down
specific instances of discrimination against the cognitively disabled, see Cleburne, 473 US
at 450, and "hippies," see Moreno, 413 US at 537, even though neither classification merited
formal heightened scrutiny. As the Sixth Circuit noted in a case involving the selective
arrest and prosecution of a lesbian for driving under the influence, the anti-animus prin-
ciple is broader than a concern with sexual orientation. "[T]he principle would be the
same if Stemler had been arrested discriminatorily based on her hair color, her college
bumper sticker (perhaps supporting an out-of-state rival) or her affiliation with a disfavored
sorority or company." Stemler, 126 F3d at 874. In this article, I will focus on the anti-
animus principle as applied in the context of sexual orientation, but that should not be
taken to mean that the animus doctrine is limited to a concern for anti-gay action by
government. On the other hand, as discussed below in Section WI.B.2.b, state action aimed
at homosexuals has historically been unusually likely to reflect animus.
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by animus denies the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the
Constitution to every person. This constitutional principle is un-
controversial. Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, implicitly agreed
that it is unconstitutional to "codify malice," though he thought
there needed to be "more convincing evidence" of that than the
Court presented.20 Nor did Justice Scalia or Justice Alito, in their
separate dissents, challenge the basic premise that animus is an
impermissible basis for legislation." Scalia, like Roberts, simply
thought a finding of animus should require "the most extraordinary
evidence," which he did not think could be found in DOMA.22 If
for no other reason than that the Court has repeatedly endorsed
the anti-animus principle in important decisions, it can no longer
be ignored.
Second, the institutional conclusion of Windsor is that courts are
competent to police unconstitutional animus. This means they must
discern when legislation impermissibly arises from animus.23 That
prospect might be very troubling. To begin with, decision makers
often have mixed motives and purposes, which calls for a judgment
about when animus is sufficiently present in the mix of motives to
justify striking down their action.24 Further, if ferreting out animus
means that courts are now self-appointed sleuths searching for the
subjective motives of legislators, it is a very dubious mission.
In fact, considering the animus quadrilogy as a whole, the Court's
decisions suggest that the inquiry into legislative motive--or more
often, purpose-is not a subjective one. Determining whether an-
imus materially influenced the government's act rests on a variety
20 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2696 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).
2 Id at 2697-711 (Scalia, J, dissenting); id at 2711-20 (Alito, J, dissenting). Justices
Scalia and Alito also didn't explicitly endorse the anti-animus principle. For his part, Justice
Scalia denounced the Court for suggesting that Congress and the President had "hateful
hearts" in supporting DOMA. "Laying such a charge against them," he declared, "should
require the most extraordinary evidence." Id at 2707 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
22 Id at 2707 (Scalia, J, dissenting). For a discussion of the indicia supporting the animus
holding, see Section III.B. Justice Alito criticized the Court for "cast[ing] all those who
cling to traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or superstitious
fools." Id at 2718 (Alito, J, dissenting). For a discussion of the objection that Windsor is
constitutional name-calling, see Section I.C.4.
23 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 103 (cited in note 2) (Judges are "in a position
objectively to assess claims-though no one could suppose the evaluation won't be full of
judgment calls-that . . . by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected rep-
resentatives are not representing the interests of those whom the system presupposes they
are.").
24 I propose that legislation reflects a constitutionally impermissible degree of animus
only when it "materially influences" passage. See Section ll.C.3.
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of considerations that are objective in the sense that they do not
depend on discovering subjective legislative intent. These include,
if applicable, considerations of statutory text, context, process, im-
pact, and the persuasiveness of any non-animus-based justifications.
Animus is not merely an illegitimate purpose; it taints the govern-
ment's action. The sometimes far-fetched and hypothesized ratio-
nalizations that suffice to sustain a law in ordinary rational-basis
cases don't suffice once animus is detected.
The third conclusion from Windsor, the substantive one, is the
most infuriating to critics. It is that DOMA itself was the product
of animus. Rather than thinking of Windsor as a federalism opinion
protecting the states' traditional authority over family relations, or
as a substantive liberty decision protecting individuals from gov-
ernment encroachment on their marital freedom, the decision is
mainly about how these two related concerns help show that DOMA
maliciously targeted a small subset of married people.
This third conclusion has been the most criticized. It is the only
one of the three to which the dissenting Justices explicitly objected.
For them, there simply was not enough evidence of animus in
DOMA. While constitutional law professors overwhelmingly be-
lieved DOMA was unconstitutional,2 5 they have not overwhelmingly
endorsed Windsor. The decision has its prominent defenders,26 but
few if any have defended its animus holding. Harsh judgments have
come from those who think the Court was wrong on the merits,
from those who think the Court reached the right result for the
wrong reason,2 7 and from those who think the decision is an in-
decipherable constitutional hieroglyph.2 8 The most unsettling por-
25 According to a 2012 survey of 485 constitutional law professors, 69 percent thought
DOMA was unconstitutional. Dale Carpenter, Constitutional Law Professors: 87% Support
Same-Sex Marriage, but Only 54% Believe It Is Constitutionally Mandated, The Volokh Con-
spiracy (Sept 7, 2012), online at http://www.volokh.com/2012/09/07/constitutional-law-
professors-87-support-same-sex-marriage-but-only-54-believe-it-is-constitutionally-man-
dated.
26 Ernest A. Young and Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States
v. Windsor, Cato S Ct Rev 117, 119 (2012-13) (praising the opinion as "brilliant"); Ernest
A. Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99
Va L Rev Online 39, 40 (2013) (the opinion is not "muddled" or "vague"); Randy Barnett,
Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2013), online
at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/.
" See Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn DOMA (cited in note 4).
" Conkle, 89 Ind L J 27 (cited in note 4); Neomi Rao, The Trouble with Dignity and
Rights of Recognition, 99 Va L Rev Online 29, 31 (2013) (criticizing the decision as "mud-
dled" and as ungrounded in constitutional text, history, and precedent); Sandy Levinson,
A Brief Comment on Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Windsor, Balkinization (June 26, 2013),
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tion of the decision for many of its critics, especially those who
oppose same-sex marriage and resent insult from the Court, is the
conclusion that DOMA arose from unconstitutional animus.29
"Kennedy's suggestion that DOMA was based on the view that gays
and lesbians are inferior human beings is tendentious in the ex-
treme," writes one critic of Windsor, "and demeaning to all those
who for a host of non-bigoted reasons uphold the traditional un-
derstanding of marriage as an essentially heterosexual institution.""
And that denunciation of the decision came from a supporter of the
constitutional claim for same-sex marriage.
These criticisms are overwrought. What we have injustice Ken-
nedy's opinion is Windsor Products-an outpouring of decades of
constitutional development whose fountainhead is Carolene Products
and whose tributaries are the gay-rights and federalism streams. I
will argue here that each of Windsor's three central conclusions-
the existence of a constitutional anti-animus principle, the assertion
of institutional capacity to decide in clear cases when it is present,
and the substantive holding that it was present in DOMA-was
correct. Its reasoning is neither incoherent nor unprecedented.
Windsor Products adds both meaning and modest method to the
more formal and even mechanical footnote 4 approach of Carolene
Products.
Despite what critics have said, Windsor did not label as bigots all
supporters of opposite-sex-only marriage or reject as homophobic
all reasons for hesitation on same-sex marriage. Among other pos-
sible non-animus-based rationales for limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples, policy makers might want to move slowly and incre-
online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-kennedys.html
(noting "the intellectual awkwardness of [Kennedy's] opinion" and comparing it to "a
camel (i.e., a horse designed by a committee)"); and Jeffrey Rosen and Michael McConnell,
Debating the Court's Gay Marriage Decisions, New Republic (June 26, 2013), at http:/f
www.newrepublic.com/article/1 13646/supreme-court-strikes-down-doma-dismisses-prop
-8-debate ("[T]he DOMA decision is a logical mish-mash, portending more litigation and
more instability.").
29 See, for example, Richard W Garnett, Worth Worrying About?: Same-Sex Marriage &
Religious Freedom, Commonweal (Commonweal Magazine, Aug 5, 2013), online at https:
//www.commonwealmagazine.org/worth-worrying-about) (arguing that Windsor con-
cluded that gay-marriage opponents are "backward and bigoted, unworthy of respect");
Michael J. Perry, Right Result, Wrong Reason: Same-Sex Marriage & The Supreme Court,
Commonweal (Commonweal Magazine, Aug 5, 2013), available online at https://www
.commonwealmagazine.org/right-decision-wrong-reason (calling the decision "tenden-
tious in the extreme").
30 Perry, Right Result, Wrong Reason (cited in note 29).
4]
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mentally in making important changes to social policy." Finally,
Windsor should be seen as probably the least aggressive route the
Court could have taken in striking down DOMA.
Section I summarizes the legislative and judicial developments
that brought the case to the Court. It discusses why Windsor should
not be seen as a federalism decision, a substantive-liberty decision,
or a sub silentio heightened-scrutiny case.
Section II presents the constitutional animus principle as it has
developed over the last four decades, including what constitutes
animus, why it offends the Constitution, and how the Supreme
Court determines it is present. This section both supports the con-
clusion that animus offends the egalitarian principle in the Con-
stitution and defends the limited institutional role of the Court in
helping to enforce it.
Section III discusses why the Court was justified in concluding
that DOMA arose from animus by looking at the textual, contextual,
procedural, effectual, and pretextual factors that explain the law's
passage. These considerations show why the posited non-animus-
based justifications for DOMA-like a desire to boost "responsible
procreation," to save federal money on benefits, or to move slowly
and incrementally on matters of social policy-could not actually
sustain the law. Even if such hypothesized justifications could save
a marriage limitation from invalidation under ordinary rational-
basis review, they cannot save it when the limitation arises from ill
will. Indeed, the flimsiness of these justifications reinforces the con-
clusion that the law was infected with animus.
I. WINDSOR AND ITS AtISINTERPRETATIONS
For many readers, simply understanding what Windsor held
has been a challenge. The decision is peripatetic. It heads down a
path toward federalism, but suddenly veers off in the direction of
"liberty," looking back over its shoulder toward states' authority.
Then it pivots toward equal protection, with darts toward dignity,
before finally settling on animus as a destination. When we arrive-
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
" As we shall see, the go-slow rationale does not really explain the passage of DOMA.
See Section III.B.5.c. Even if a go-slow rationale might more convincingly support a state
marriage law under anti-animus attack, laws excluding gay couples from marriage may
have other constitutional defects.
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affirmed" 32-we may ask ourselves, "Well, how did [we] get here?""
This section first summarizes the legislative steps that led to the
passage of DOMA. A more detailed consideration of the legislative
proceedings and how they connect to concerns about animus awaits
the reader in Section III. Next, it chronicles the judicial develop-
ments that brought the case to the Supreme Court in 2013. Finally,
it argues that Windsor should not be seen as a federalism decision,
a substantive-liberty decision, or a heightened-scrutiny decision.
A. THE ACT
In the summer of 1996, responding to the possibility that the
Hawaii Supreme Court might order that state to recognize same-
sex marriages, Congress placed DOMA on a fast track to passage.
Section 2 declared that no state could be required to recognize
any other state's same-sex marriages:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship."4
This permission slip to disregard marriages validly recognized in
sister states was probably redundant of states' conflict-of-laws
powers to reject out-of-state marriages violating their own public
policy. It was also unprecedented. Congress had never before de-
creed, using its "effects" power under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,3 s that a state's laws and even its judicial judgments could
be categorically ignored by the other forty-nine states.
Section 3, which was challenged in Windsor, dealt with the prob-
lem of how the federal government should treat marriages validly
recognized in a state. It limited marriage for all federal purposes
to the union of one man and one woman:
3 United States v Windsor, 133 S Ct 2675, 2696 (2013).
Apologies to David Byrne, Talking Heads, Once in a Lifetime (lyrics) (Sire Records,
1981).
34 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 28
USC § 1738C.
" "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." US Const, Art IV, § 1.
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife. 6
These sixty-five words abruptly, summarily, and comprehensively
ended two centuries of federal deference to state choices about
the definition and recognition of marital status.
On July 12, the House of Representatives voted for DOMA
with an overwhelming and strongly bipartisan majority, 342-67."
With a presidential election just months away and public opinion
running strongly against gay marriage, President Clinton backed
the law before it was even introduced in the Senate. But his own
press spokesperson labeled it election-year "gay baiting" on the
very day it passed the House." The Senate passed it on September
10 by a vote of 85-14, again with strong bipartisan support.3 ' The
president sheepishly signed it just after midnight on September
21, releasing an unusual statement urging that the law "should
not, despite the fierce and at times divisive rhetoric surrounding
it, be understood to provide an excuse for discrimination, violence
or intimidation against any person on the basis of sexual orien-
tation."'
DOMA, it was hoped, would provide a double vaccination
against the spread of same-sex marriages. In 1993, the Hawaii
Supreme Court announced that heightened judicial scrutiny
should apply to a ban on same-sex marriage because the denial
constituted sex discrimination under the state constitution.4 1 It
then remanded the case, originally brought by same-sex couples
in 1990, back to the state trial court for a trial on the merits under
the appropriate level of scrutiny. The trial court was set to take
up the case again in September 1996, and the common expectation
6 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 1
USC § 7.
" See Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2696 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).
Jerry Gray, House Passes Bar to U.S. Sanction of Gay Marriage, NY Times Al (July 13,
1996).
' See id.
4 Chris Geidner, Becoming Law, Metroweekly (Sept 29, 2011), online at http://
www.metroweekly.com/feature/?ak= 6613.
41 Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44, 65 (Hawaii 1993).
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was that the state's refusal to allow same-sex marriages would be
struck down because the state could not show that denying mar-
riage licenses to gay couples was closely related to any compelling
state interest. On appeal, it was expected that the Hawaii Supreme
Court would eventually declare the marriage law unconstitutional.
Thus, at some point in the future, there would be gay marriage
in one state. DOMA would solve two perceived problems arising
from that fact. First, Section 2 prevented couples around the coun-
try from traveling to Hawaii, getting married, and then demanding
marital recognition in their home states. Second, Section 3 ensured
that the federal government would not have to recognize even one
such marriage from any state.
B. THE CHALLENGE
As it happened, DOMA had no immediate effect as there would
not be a state-recognized same-sex marriage anywhere in the
United States until 2004, when Massachusetts became the first
state to legalize it.4 2 Ironically, the very litigation that had pro-
pelled DOMA reached a dead end before the state Supreme Court
could rule, when the people of Hawaii voted to strip state courts
of any power to change the definition of marriage.
As the number of states recognizing same-sex marriage grew,
so did the number of couples denied federal benefits and legal
protections to which they would otherwise have been eligible.
Lawsuits challenging DOMA on constitutional grounds began to
sprout. In 2009, two challenges arose from Massachusetts. Gill v
Office ofPersonnel Management,' filed by Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders (GLAD), argued that Section 3 violated equal pro-
tection principles. The second case, Massachusetts v Department of
Health and Human Services," filed by Massachusetts, claimed that
Section 3 intruded on the power and sovereignty of the states and
codified animus against gay people. The district court concluded
" Massachusetts began to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in May 2004, six
months after a ruling for gay marriage by the state supreme court in Goodridge v Department
of Public Health, 798 NE2d 941 (Mass 2003).
43 See Hawaii Const, Art I, § 23.
682 F3d I (1st Cir 2012).
45 Id.
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that DOMA was indeed unconstitutional,' and the First Circuit
agreed on equal protection grounds.47
The year that Gill and Massachusetts were filed was also the year
that Edith Windsor's spouse, Thea Spyer, died. While the two
had been married in Canada in 2007, at a time when New York
did not yet permit same-sex marriages, their union was recognized
in New York under state conflict-of-law principles. But where New
York saw a married couple, under DOMA, the federal government
saw only legal strangers. That meant Windsor had to pay the
federal estate tax for her inheritance from Spyer, a tax from which
a surviving opposite-sex spouse is exempt.4 8
Windsor paid $363,053 in estate tax and sued the government
for a refund in the Southern District of New York. Her lawyers
at the American Civil Liberties Union argued that DOMA's Sec-
tion 3 violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause guaranty
of equal protection."
The district court decided that DOMA failed the rational-basis
test.so In October 2012, the Second Circuit applied heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation and likewise
concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional.s" Within two
months, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the equal pro-
tection issue. The parties and their numerous amici thus directed
their arguments at the equal protection question, rather than at
the issue of whether there is a fundamental right of same-sex
couples to marry.
C. THREE COMMON MISREADINGS OF WINDSOR
Justice Kennedy's opinion is an amalgam of federalism, liberty,
and equality, and thus expresses corresponding structural, sub-
stantive, and process-based concerns. Within each of these types
of concerns, moreover, there are numerous possible approaches
suggested by the opinion. Below I outline some possible reasons
46 Massachusetts v United States Department of Health and Human Services, 698 F Supp 2d
234, 253 (D Mass 2010).
' Massachusetts, 682 F3d at 9-13.
* Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2682.
49 Windsor v United States, 699 F3d 169, 188 (2d Cir 2012).
so Windsor v United States, 833 F Supp 2d 394, 406 (SDNY 2012).
s' Id at 185.
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for DOMA's invalidation, all of which find some support in the
decision but are ultimately unsatisfying.
Let's start with three propositions that Windsor might be
thought to stand for:
1. The federal government's decision not to recognize state-sanc-
tioned marriages of same-sex couples was an unconstitutional
intrusion on federalism (a structural claim);
2. The federal government's decision not to recognize state-sanc-
tioned marriages of same-sex couples was an unconstitutional
infringement of a substantive right, for example, the right to
marry (a liberty claim); or
3. The federal government's decision not to recognize state-sanc-
tioned marriages of same-sex couples denied the equal protec-
tion of the law because discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation draws heightened judicial scrutiny, and the federal
government cannot satisfy that inquiry (an equal protection
claim).
There are as many readings of Windsor as there are constitutional
law scholars; in fact, there are probably many more.52 These three
are among the many plausible interpretations, but some expla-
nations are more plausible than others. None of these adequately
explains the decision.
1. The federalism reading of Windsor. The argument that DOMA
failed as a matter of federalism, applied through the lens of equal
protection, was suggested in an amicus brief that I signed with
several other academics.s3 Our view, as expressed in the brief, was
that Section 3 failed equal protection review for a reason quite
distinct from the standard approaches relying on heightened scru-
tiny. We argued that whatever else may be its constitutional de-
fects, Section 3 was not an exercise of any enumerated federal
52 Will Baude has noted the openness of the opinion to a variety of interpretations. See
William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After Windsor, 8 NYU J L &
Lib 150 (2013).
" Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor,
United States v Windsor, No 12-307 (filed March 2013). The argument was largely the
brainchild of Professor Ernest Young, who led the drafting effort, along with the superb
attorneys Roy Englert, Carina Cuellar, and Erin Blondel at Robbins, Russell, Englert,
Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP. In addition to Professor Young and me, the other
signers were Professors Jonathan Adler, Lynn Baker, Randy Barnett, and Ilya Somin. For
an alternative approach to DOMA that also blends federalism and equality principles, see
Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15 U Pa J Const L
377 (2012).
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power. It was also not a "necessary and proper" measure to carry
into execution any of Congress's enumerated powers. Instead, it
was an unprecedented expansion of federal authority into a domain
traditionally controlled by the states. The federal government
claimed a hitherto unknown and sweeping power to determine
marital and family status.
While Congress had not prohibited states from recognizing
same-sex marriages, we argued that DOMA greatly complicated
and burdened their police power to do so. We acknowledged that
Congress has authority to limit access to specific federal benefits
otherwise available to validly married people. But Section 3, as an
across-the-board enactment untethered to any specific power, was
not plainly adapted to serve any "legitimate" interest of the federal
government.
We asserted that the federal government can have no legitimate
interest in regulating beyond its enumerated (and necessarily and
properly implied) powers. And if Section 3 of DOMA did not
serve any legitimate interest-indeed, if a sweeping federal de-
termination of marital status is constitutionally prohibited-then
Section 3 could not be justified under any level of scrutiny that
might apply under equal protection principles.
Vhile sounding in federalism, the argument was ultimately
aimed at the equal protection analysis the Court agreed to review.
It was an argument that there is, in fact, a federalism component
in the equal protection principles made applicable to the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
It was thus different from the Tenth Amendment decision by the
Massachusetts District Court in a similar case challenging
DOMA." The federalism argument did not rely on the Tenth
Amendment, but on the limits on federal power that exist even
without that amendment.
On the eve of oral argument in Windsor, Michael McConnell
also endorsed federalism as a basis to hold DOMA unconstitu-
tional:
The leading argument against DOMA all along has been that the federal
government lacks authority under the Constitution to create and en-
force a definition of marriage different from that of the state in which
a couple resides. It is hard to think of an issue more clearly reserved
5 Massachusetts, 698 F Supp 2d at 249.
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to state law under constitutional tradition than the definition of mar-
riage.'s
Thus, the federalism argument did not lack supporters. It was
obvious in the Windsor oral argument that these concerns were
shared by several Justices. But how did the argument fare in the
actual decision?
Justice Kennedy's opinion on the merits of Section 3 opened
with a discussion of how states have gradually considered and
approved the extension of marriage to same-sex couples. Those
states, he observed, had concluded that "[t]he limitation of lawful
marriage to heterosexual couples" is "an unjust exclusion."s"
Though Congress may enact "limited federal laws that regulate
the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy" related
to discrete areas like immigration and income-based criteria for
Social Security, DOMA is "applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes
and the whole realm of federal regulations.""
Justice Kennedy declared that a consideration of DOMA's in-
trusion on an area of traditional state authority is essential to the
analysis of its constitutionality. "In order to assess the validity of
that intervention," he wrote, "it is necessary to discuss the extent
of the state power and authority over marriage as a matter of
history and tradition."s" His discussion of state authority set up
the argument that DOMA was a significant intrusion on the "dig-
nity and status" that comes with being married in the same way as
everyone else in the state. Marriage had always been "uniform for
all married couples within each state," but DOMA rejected that
tradition. This was important, in turn, not because it violated
federalism but because "discriminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration . . . ."s' That was one
" See Michael McConnell, The Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage, Wall StreetJournal
(May 21, 2013), available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873242
81004578354300151597848.html. See also George F. Will, DOMA Is an Abuse of Feder-
alism, Washington Post (March 20, 2013), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/george-f-will-doma-infringes-on-states-rights/2013/03/20/fa845348-90bb- lle2
-bdea-e32ad90da239.story.html; James Taranto, Maybe Scalia Was Wrong, Wall Street
Journal (March 28, 2013), online at http://online.wsj.comInews/articles/SBl0001424127
887324685104578388490905521114.
s6 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2689.
5 Id at 2690.
' Id at 2691.
' Id at 2692, quoting Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 633 (1996).
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important factor in the animus analysis (it explained the contexto).
The next two pages of the opinion were devoted to citations af-
firming state primacy over the field of family relations, the def-
erence Congress had traditionally showed to state law, and the
historical pedigree of this division of state and federal authority."
The Chief Justice, in dissent, had considerable justification for
saying that federalism was the "dominant theme" of the majority
opinion. But Chief Justice Roberts went one step further in char-
acterizing the Court's holding: "[I]t is undeniable that its judgment
is based on federalism."6 2
That was an overstatement. After discussing the interests of the
states in controlling family law, Justice Kennedy expressly stated
that the Court was not relying strictly on federalism. "Despite these
considerations," he wrote, "it is unnecessary to decide whether
this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Consti-
tution because it disrupts the federal balance.""
Surely a statement in a decision declaring what it means should
have some bearing on what it means. The Chief Justice, in dissent,
thought federalism was nevertheless critical to the result and would
help to distinguish the case from one that involved a claimed
constitutional right to state recognition of same-sex marriages. He
might be right about that. But the Chief Justice's explanation may
have been more a hope about the limited consequences of an
alternative and more aggressive Windsor than it was a reading of
the actual Windsor. Either that or, as Justice Scalia would have it,
Chief Justice Roberts was "fool[ed] . . . into thinking that this is
a federalism opinion.""
2. The substantive-liberty reading of Windsor. As for the second
proposition, that the Court upheld a substantive-liberty claim, the
Court certainly mentioned liberty several times. And the context
was one in which the plaintiffs claimed that "liberty" protected a
right to have their marriages fully recognized by government. The
Court set for itself the task of deciding "whether the resulting
injury and indignity is a deprivation of . .. the liberty protected
60 See discussion of the federalism context in Section II.B. .
61 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2692-93.
62 Id at 2697 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting).
63 Id at 2692.
64 Id at 2705.
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by the Fifth Amendment.""5 It concluded that Congress "cannot
deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.""
But my sense is that reliance on the word "liberty" here was
more a doctrinal formality than a substantive holding. Windsor was
rooted in the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, which protects "liberty" against cer-
tain deprivations but makes no mention of "equal protection."
"Liberty" in the Fifth Amendment has been understood to protect
individuals from federal government action that denies them equal
protection."
Windsor arose only because the states themselves decided to
recognize a substantive liberty to marry, not because the federal
government had an independent constitutional obligation to rec-
ognize a fundamental right to marry." If the states themselves did
not recogmze same-sex marriages, the federal government would
not be required by Windsor to issue federal marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. Marital recognition starts in the states, and it's
hard to argue that Windsor held otherwise, though one could say
that some liberty principle in Windsor (perhaps "dignity") is avail-
able for future litigation to force state recognition of such mar-
riages."
3. The heightened-scrutiny reading of Windsor. In SmithKline Bee-
cham Corporation v Abbott Laboratories,"o an otherwise unremarkable
antitrust and unfair-trade-practices case, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that heightened scrutiny should apply to classifications
based on sexual orientation because Windsor "requires" it." For
that reason, the panel held that a potential juror could not be
5 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2692.
66 Id at 2695.
6 Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499-500 (1954).
6 "In Windsor, the Supreme Court did not clearly state that the non-recognition of
marriages under Section 3 of DOMA implicated a fundamental right, much less signifi-
cantly interfered with one." Bourke v Besbear, 2014 WL 556729, *5 (WD Ky).
69 But see Douglas NeJaime, Windsor's Right to Marry, 123 Yale L J Online 219, 237-
47 (2013) (arguing that principles advanced by gay-marriage advocates for a fundamental
right to marry influenced the Court's decision, and may eventually lead to a successful
equal protection claim against the exclusion of same-sex couples from state marriage laws).
7 SmitbKline Beecham Corporation v Abbott Laboratories, No 11-17357 & 11-17373, slip
op (Jan 21, 2014), online at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/01/24/
11-17357.pdo.
71 Id at 20.
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excluded based solely on sexual orientation. Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt acknowledged that Windsor "did not expressly announce the
level of scrutiny it applied to the equal protection claim" against
DOMA.72 That, of course, was precisely what Windsor's lawyers
and the Justice Department had urged the Court to do: treat anti-
gay discrimination as presumptively unconstitutional, requiring a
particularly strong justification and closely tailored means. But
reading between the lines in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the Court had indeed applied heightened scrutiny.
Among other reasons for that interpretation of Windsor, the panel
noted that the Court had not hypothesized possible rational bases
for DOMA, as it would do in most rational-basis cases. Instead,
the Court had evaluated only Congress's actual justifications."
Reinhardt also described Windsor as having required Congress to
justify its unequal treatment of gays rather than indulging in the
usual presumption of constitutionality for congressional acts."
This is an aggressive and incomplete reading of Windsor. Justice
Kennedy's opinion didn't specify any level of scrutiny. There was
no requirement that the government's objective be "important"
or "compelling," the hallmarks of the kinds of interests required
to satisfy intermediate or strict scrutiny. There was no requirement
that the means be "closely" or "necessarily" tailored to the ob-
jective, either.
More tellingly, the Windsor Court did not discuss why height-
ened scrutiny should be applied to sexual-orientation discrimi-
nation, a minimal analytical expectation if the Court is really about
to start down that road. There was no mention in Windsor of the
factors commonly associated with a heightened-scrutiny approach,
like immutability, the irrelevance of the trait to merit, or political
powerlessness.7 s The Court's decision to apply heightened scrutiny
would be a break from almost every circuit court that has con-
sidered the issue, a watershed that would ordinarily be shouted
rather than whispered, made explicit rather than implied.
In fact, the Windsor court did not even characterize DOMA as
7 Id at 17.
" Id at 20.
" SmitbKline Beecham Corp., No 11-17357 & 11-17373, slip op at 20.
See factors considered in City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 440-
42 (1985), in which the Court rejected heightened equal protection scrutiny for classi-
fications based on cognitive disability.
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discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation-the critical issue
in SmithKline Beecham Corporation. It did not say that homosexuals
per se had been disadvantaged by the exclusion from federal rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages. Instead, the Court identified the
burdened class as same-sex couples who were validly married under
state law." It was relevant to the animus determination that these
couples were gay couples, as we shall see. But the Court did not
take the next logical step of declaring all anti-gay discrimination
unconstitutional."
It might well be that Windsor is a precursor to heightened scru-
tiny of sexual-orientation classifications, just as Reed v Reed" was
a first step toward intermediate scrutiny of sex-based discrimi-
nation. But we have seen this movie before: the same prediction
was made when the Court decided Romer v Evans using an un-
usually skeptical form of rational-basis review." And the same
speculation about heightened scrutiny arose after Lawrence. After
two false starts, it makes sense to start looking elsewhere for an
answer.
As argued in Section II below, Windsor stands outside the con-
ventional tiers-of-scrutiny analysis. In cases where the Court has
found animus, it does not engage in the usual equal protection
review. A specialized form of review peculiar to animus cases ap-
plies. That's what ties Windsor to Lawrence and Romer, as well as
to older cases like Moreno, Cleburne, and to Carolene Products itself.
Like many courts and commentators, the Ninth Circuit in
SmithKline Beecham Corporation failed to attribute any independent
weight to the animus analysis. That is an error that can no longer
be justified.
II. ANIMUS AND ITS AGONISTES
Instead of seeing Windsor as a substantive liberty or con-
ventional equal protection decision, we should see it primarily as
an animus case. That is justified by a plain reading of the decision,
" Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2695 ("The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and
restraints are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the
State.").
n "In Windsor, no clear majority ofJustices stated that sexual orientation was a suspect
category." Bourke v Beshear, 2014 WL 556729, *5 (WD Ky).
n 404 US 71 (1971).
7 Farber and Sherry, 13 Const Comm at 257 (cited in note 11).
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which concludes with an entire section on animus, and by the way
the Court itself characterized its holding. It's also justified by the
failure of other prominent readings to account for the result.
For now at least, Windsor is controversial. But while the fed-
eralism analysis in Windsor has drawn disagreement and baffle-
ment, the animus portion of the decision has elicited outrage.
Whether DOMA reflected animus is at the heart of the dispute
about the result. But leaving DOMA aside for a moment, what
about the antecedent question: is animus itself an unconstitutional
basis for legislation? I argue below that the answer is yes, and that
answer should not be controversial. The concept is a familiar one
in constitutional law. It follows from the Court's precedents, from
constitutional history, and from some basic constitutional-dem-
ocratic theory about permissible legislative enactments.
This section explains why Windsor should be seen primarily as
an animus decision, why that rationale for striking down legislation
is justified as a matter of equal protection, and why critics of the
anti-animus principle are wrong. Explaining how the Court got
to its animus determination in the DOMA case first requires an
examination of the Court's animus decisions in Moreno, Cleburne,
and Romer, along with its due process holding in Lawrence.
A. THE ANIMUS PRECEDENTS: MORENO, CLEBURNE, AND ROMER
(PLUS LAWRENCE)
Long before Windsor, Cass Sunstein referred to the Court's
animus decisions as a trilogy."o It was an apt description since the
Court's animus jurisprudence has been a work in progress. To
these three decisions, we might add Lawrence v Texas, which in-
dicated the Court's low regard for laws aimed at homosexuals and
declined to accept a moral justification for a criminal sodomy law.
If these cases, together with Windsor, are to be regarded as any-
thing more than what Sunstein memorably called "a kind of mag-
ical trump card, a joker, hidden in the pack and used on special
occasions"" they must be more fully linked and theorized. Each
o Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 146
(Harvard, 2001). See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv L Rev 747
(2011) (discussing heightened rational-basis scrutiny present in Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer).




decision added something distinctive to anti-animus methodology.
1. United States Department of Agriculture v Moreno. In Moreno,
the Court invalidated a federal law denying food stamps to any
household containing one or more people unrelated by blood or
marriage to others in the household. In a "declaration of policy"
accompanying the Food Stamp Act, Congress asserted two reasons
for creating the program: ensuring adequate levels of nutrition
among low-income households and strengthening the market for
agriculture.82 But these stated purposes were "irrelevant" to ex-
cluding households of unrelated people, concluded the Court,
since such people had nutritional needs and since food purchases
by them would equally benefit domestic agriculture." Thus, even
under rational-basis review, the stated justifications were insuffi-
cient.
So what was the real reason for the exclusion? The Court noted
that there was little legislative history to explain the amendment,
which was inserted without any committee consideration. "The
legislative history that does exist," the Court noted, "indicates that
that amendment was intended to prevent 'hippies' and 'hippie
communes' from participating in the food stamp program."" Here
was the heart of the problem:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference
to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of
"equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."s
The "purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of
itself and without reference to (some independent) considerations
in the public interest," justify the exclusion." To be constitutional
under equal protection principles, an enactment must have a pub-
lic-regarding reason other than to disadvantage a group.
Every classification can be characterized negatively as "discrim-
ination" against the group it disadvantages. Every classification
can also be recast affirmatively as serving at least the good of
82 United States Department of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528, 533 (1973).
e Id at 534.
14 Id.
" Id.
6 Id at 534-35, quoting Moreno v United States Department of Agriculture, 354 F Supp
310, 314 n 11 (DDC 1972).
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codifying the principle that the classification serves. In light of
direct evidence in the legislative history of animus against "hip-
pies" and "hippie communes," however, the Court refused to defer
to hypothetical alternative justifications or to entertain more
friendly restatements of Congress's evident animus.
Even if it were true that the exclusion bore no relationship to
the stated congressional purposes of providing nutrition or spur-
ring agricultural purchases, it might be rationally related to other
hypothetical congressional purposes. The government argued
early on in the litigation that excluding households of unrelated
persons from the program would foster "morality,"" presumably
by discouraging opposite-sex cohabitation. Being "pro-morality"
might simply be a nicer way to say "anti-hippie." In his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist asserted that Congress could decide to fund only
"the family as we know it."" The strategy, like Justice Scalia's in
Romer, was not to reject the animus analysis completely, but to
recast the "bare desire to harm" as an effort to promote a tradi-
tional moral commitment.8 9 But the district court had rejected this
argument because the exclusion applied regardless of the sexes of
the unrelated persons. The government subsequently abandoned
the contention.90
Another hypothetical purpose, advanced by the government and
by the dissent, was that the exclusion helped prevent fraud by
"conceivably deny[ing] food stamps to members of households
which have been formed solely for the purpose of taking advantage
of the food stamp program."" Yet anti-fraud purposes did not
explain why Congress needed to exclude all households containing
unmarried persons, especially when other anti-fraud provisions in
the Food Stamp Act dealt with the "voluntarily poor" who didn't
want to work.92 In an ordinary rational-basis case, the fact that
the exclusion would at least minimally prevent fraud surely would
have been good enough. As Justice Rehnquist noted, the fact that
it would have "unfortunate and perhaps unintended consequences
* Id at 535 n 7.
Id at 546 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting).
" Sunstein, One Case at a Time at 147 (cited in note 80).
* Moreno, 413 US at 535 n 7.
"Id at 547 (Rehnquist dissenting).
12 Id at 535-37.
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beyond [preventing fraud] does not make it unconstitutional.""
Yet the Court noted that the only people severed from the pro-
gram as part of this "anti-fraud" rationale were those "who are so
desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter
their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility" for food
stamps." The Court seemed to be saying that harm to a class
could not be dismissed as merely incidental to the law where the
means were so weakly related to purpose and where evidence of
animus was otherwise present. On the slimmest justification, Con-
gress had imposed a significant burden on a group of people.
Finally, the government speculated that perhaps anti-fraud con-
cerns with households of unrelated persons were heightened be-
cause "such households are 'relatively unstable,' thereby increasing
the difficulty of detecting such abuses." The Court noted that this
rationale relied on "wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concern-
ing the differences between 'related' and 'unrelated' households.""
Moreno laid the groundwork for a self-conscious anti-animus
jurisprudence, ruling out a bare desire to harm a class as a per-
missible legislative purpose. The decision bore the political-pro-
cess concerns laid down in Carolene Products by highlighting the
fact that the affected class was "politically unpopular," and thus
one for which resort to the political process was unlikely to work.
It established that in such circumstances the Court was willing to
examine whether the actual justifications for legislation were plau-
sibly related to the exclusion of the class. It signaled that the Court
would look into the legislative process, including the legislative
history, to determine whether animus was present. Having found
such evidence, the Court would then skeptically scrutinize hy-
pothesized justifications, departing from ordinarily deferential ra-
tional-basis review. It would not accept "wholly unsubstantiated"
claims about the excluded group. It would consider the harm in-
flicted on them by the exclusion. And it would not accept at face
value that any harm done to them was excusably "incidental" to
the exclusion. There are echoes of all of these themes in Windsor.
2. City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center The Court next
addressed animus in an Equal Protection case twelve years later
* Id at 547 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting).
* Id at 538.
9 Id at 535.
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in Cleburne, unanimously concluding that the city had unconsti-
tutionally denied a special zoning permit to a proposed group
home for the cognitively disabled."6 The Court first rejected the
idea that classifications aimed at the cognitively disabled should
formally be subjected to heightened scrutiny even though there
had been a long history of legal discrimination against, and social
antipathy toward, the group. This sorry history had included eu-
genic marriage and sterilization laws, lifelong institutionalization,
and exclusion from public schools.97 Among other reasons for re-
jecting heightened scrutiny, the Court noted that "lawmakers have
been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a con-
tinuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary."98 But in particular cases the
Court observed that discrimination against the group would in-
deed be "invidious," justifying "judicial correction under consti-
tutional norms."99 Quoting Moreno, the Court held that "some
objectives-such as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically un-
popular group'-are not legitimate state interests."'o
Why did the denial of a special zoning permit for a group home
constitute animus? Certainly the city of Cleburne did not concede
that it had acted simply out of desire to harm cognitively disabled
people. Instead, the city said it was responding to the "negative
attitudes of the majority of property owners" nearby and to the
"fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood." 0 ' "But mere neg-
ative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are prop-
erly cognizable in a zoning proceeding," the Court responded, did
not justify treating a home for the cognitively disabled differently
from proposed apartments or other multiple-unit dwellings.'0 2
The same fate awaited the city's worry that the home would be
located near a junior high school, whose students might harass
people living in the home. These "vague, undifferentiated fears"
by the community could not "validate what would otherwise be
9 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432 (1985).
1 Id at 461-63 (Marshall, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" Id at 443.
9 Id at 446.
" Id at 446-47 (citation omitted).




an equal protection violation" if state officials themselves harbored
such attitudes.'0 3
Other asserted reasons for denying the special use permit-the
fact that the home would sit on a 500-year-floodplain, doubts
about who would be legally responsible if a resident caused dam-
age, concerns about neighborhood density-did not rationally ex-
plain why the city would have allowed homes for other groups,
like fraternities, nursing homes, boarding houses, or dormito-
ries. o' All of the city's justifications appeared to be strained efforts
to allow it to act on prejudice and fears of the cognitively disabled.
"The short of it," Justice White's opinion concluded, "is that re-
quiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded." 0 5
This analysis suggests that a different fate would have befallen
an oil company's complaint that a city denied a special permit to
construct a gas station in the neighborhood. While we can spec-
ulate that city officials might indeed feel "animus" toward big oil
companies, and nearby residents might oppose the construction
of a station, a decision to deny such a permit would be plausibly
explicable on safety grounds, on the desire to preserve a noncom-
mercial zone for private residents, or even on aesthetic criteria.
Such considerations would be common in a zoning decision, not
out of the ordinary. The decision would be rationally related to
avoiding real harm to the neighborhood quite apart from any
general dislike of oil companies. Finally, the aggrieved oil company
would not be the kind of politically unpopular minority that is
unlikely to get its interests taken seriously in the halls of govern-
ment.
Cleburne added to the animus doctrine in several respects. It
clarified that even though a classification might not generally war-
rant heightened scrutiny, some actions taken against a class might
nevertheless reflect impermissible bias. To be rational, a law must
serve a "legitimate" end, and antipathy can never be a legitimate
end. Cleburne pointed out that a departure from the usual sub-
stantive considerations governing a decision may itself raise sus-
picion that the decision was born of animus. An analogous concern
'o' Id at 449.
104 Id at 449-50.
1os Id at 450.
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about discriminations of an unusual character arose in Windsor,
where the government departed from its usual respect for state
determinations of marital status. The Court also held that acting
to assuage the animosity of constituents toward a politically un-
popular class was as impermissible as acting on government of-
ficials' own personal animosity toward that class. Private citizens
may carry irrational fear and hatred of a group, but government
may not effectuate those feelings by discriminating against the
group. Similarly, in Windsor, the Court noted that DOMA arose
from disapproval of homosexuality itself.
3. Romer v Evans. Eleven years later, just as DOMA was intro-
duced, Justice Kennedy wrote the 6-3 opinion in Romer.106 In that
decision, the Court struck down Colorado's Amendment 2, a broad
state constitutional amendment that wiped away all existing anti-
discrimination protection that specifically protected gay men and
lesbians at every level and in every department of state govern-
ment. Amendment 2 also forbade cities, counties, departments,
and even the state legislature to pass such protections in the future.
The state did this to no other identity-based group that had long
been subject to invidious public and private discrimination.
Amendment 2 was a backlash against the limited success of gay-
rights activists in securing modest antidiscrimination protection
in a few areas.'
The Court was concerned that Amendment 2 was almost un-
limited in scope and significantly injured gay people. On the first
point regarding its scope, the Court noted that Amendment 2 was
"[s]weeping and comprehensive" and "far reaching" in altering the
legal status of homosexuals, placing them "in a solitary class." The
amendment withdrew "from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination.""0o It
applied to "all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance,
health and welfare services, private education, and employ-
ment."l09 It repealed and forbade existing protection from dis-
crimination in state government employment and at state univer-
sities, among other areas of law."o
" Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).
107 Id at 623-25.
1os Id at 627.
1" Id at 629.
no Id at 629-30.
[2013
WINDSOR PRODUCTS 211
On the real harm this extensive enactment visited on gay people
alone, the Court observed that for homosexuals, antidiscrimination
protections are not mere "special rights." This put gay people in
a different position from people who do not need specific pro-
tection (like blue-eyed people or lawyers) or already have such
protection (like women, people of color, and religious minorities).
Far from privileging gay men and lesbians, Justice Kennedy noted,
antidiscrimination laws put them on an equal footing in "an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute or-
dinary civic life in a free society."'"
The Court discerned equal protection violations in two respects.
The first was that the law was "at once too narrow and too broad":
it withdrew civil rights protections across the board for homo-
sexuals alone.112 The second was that by "imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group" it was "in-
explicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects."
Importantly, the Court cited previous rational-basis cases in which
it had upheld laws that simply "work[ed] to the disadvantage of a
particular group."' But those cases, involving matters like the
regulation of optometry, reviewed laws in which both the justi-
fication and the burden were limited. Those contexts allow the
Court to "ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."" 4 Amendment
2 was "unprecedented" in its sweep, observed the Court, which
was itself "instructive" because "[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine
whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.""s
The too-broad-and-too-narrow structure of Amendment 2
"raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
". Id at 631.
".. Id at 633.
"' Id at 632, citing New Orleans v Dukes, 427 US 297 (1976) (law favored certain pushcart
vendors); Williamson v Lee Optical of Okla, Inc., 348 US 483 (1955) (law favored optometrist
over opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v New York, 336 US 106 (law favored vehicles
displaying ads of owner's products); and Kotch v Board of River Pilot Commissioners for Port
of New Orleans, 330 US 552 (1947) (law favored persons related to current river boat
pilots).
" Id at 633, citing Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens,
J, concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the
legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.").
"' Romer, 517 US at 633, quoting Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v Coleman, 277 US 32,
37-38 (1928).
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born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."' 16 It's not
that broad laws are invariably unconstitutional. They are consti-
tutional if they "can be explained by reference to legitimate public
policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on
certain persons.""'
But the "immediate, continuing, and real injuries" inflicted by
Amendment 2 were not simply incidental to the law, concluded
the Court. How did the majority know that? It did not cite any
of the statements made by Amendment 2 supporters during the
campaign to pass it, though a plethora of false anti-gay claims
could have been cited. It did not cite opinion polls showing that
Coloradans disapproved homosexuals or homosexuality. Instead,
it cited the objective fact that in justifying such a sweeping mea-
sure, the official rationales for Amendment 2 were very narrow:
protecting the liberties of landlords and employers who object to
homosexuality and conserving state government resources for
fighting other kinds of discrimination. Animus was inferred from
the unprecedented gap between an all-encompassing law and its
claimed narrow purposes.
Romer introduced several themes that were further developed
in Windsor. First, animus analysis is especially alert to laws of a
broad character aimed at a particular class. Such laws inflict broad
injury on a single group, raising Carolene Products-type concerns
since the affected group will often lack allies in the political pro-
cess. Second, while it's true that a law is not unconstitutional
simply because it incidentally harms the interests of a class, such
harm cannot be the aim of the law. Third, the Court need not
have direct evidence of animus or inquire into the subjective mo-
tivations of legislators or voters. An assessment of the real aim of
the law can be gleaned from objective considerations of scope and
justification. Fourth, the Court will not simply accept anything
the state says by way of justifying its laws. If the stated aims don't
really explain the enactment, the remaining explanation is animus.
Romer left open a major question in animus doctrine. To render
the law unconstitutional, must animus be the only real purpose?
Is it sufficient if animus is simply the primary reason for the law,
the dominant purpose among several others? Moving along the
"6 Id at 634.
Id at 635 (emphasis added).
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spectrum, is the law unconstitutional if animus is a but-for expla-
nation, nonprimary but nonetheless necessary for its passage? Or
can the law be invalidated if animus explains any part of the pur-
pose of the law?
Whichever it was, Romer, handed down on May 20, 1996, fore-
told the death of DOMA even at the moment of the law's birth.
Some members of Congress who supported DOMA realized the
new scrutiny the Court was giving to anti-gay legislation and
stressed that the legislation was not an effort to hurt gay people."'
But during floor "debate"-as the prepared speeches that members
of Congress deliver is called-numerous supporters made clear
that they saw DOMA as a way to express disdain for homosexu-
als. 1 19
4. A brief detour: Lawrence v Texas. Lurking behind the Romer
opinion was the Court's dawning realization that gay men and
lesbians are a class that might "need" the special protection of the
law. This was a first in the Court's jurisprudence. While not an
"animus" decision in a formal doctrinal sense, Lawrence nonethe-
less confirmed the Court's conclusion that gays were often a target
for class legislation insulting their dignity. The Texas sodomy law
was, after all, actually a "Homosexual Conduct" law that forbade
anal and oral sex only if committed by two people of the same
sex. Yet the moral interests it was said to serve came from a tra-
dition that disfavored all nonprocreative, nonmarital sex. In a sense
then, it was the mirror opposite of Romer. It had a much broader
justification (broadly applicable moral sentiments) but a much nar-
rower focus (selecting only the immoral activity of one group for
disfavor).
Yet the harm done by the Texas law to this particular group was
itself extensive. Justice Kennedy's opinion, his second in a major
gay-rights case, emphasized how the Texas statute affected more
than specified sexual conduct. Indeed, it "demeans the claim" of
gay people to say that only sexual acts were at issue. Sodomy laws,
in fact, had far-reaching "penalties and purposes" that invaded
private adult sexual autonomy and did so in the most private space,
the home. For those subject to the law, the Texas statute amounted
to an attack on "their dignity as free persons."'1
"' See, for example, Section E.C.3.
" Id.
120 Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 567 (2003).
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Under the Equal Protection Clause citizens are entitled to de-
mand respect for constitutionally protected conduct. Sodomy laws
imposed "stigma" on gay people. This stigma had a real-world
effect. "When homosexual conduct is made criminal by law of the
state," concluded the Court, "that declaration in and of itself is
an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both
in the public and in the private spheres."l2 1 Sodomy laws thus
attacked gays' standing in their own community. Bowers v Hard-
wick, which had upheld a general anti-sodomy law applicable both
to heterosexuals and homosexuals with language that made it seem
appropriate for the law to target only homosexuals, had to be
overruled because "[i]ts continuance as precedent demeans the
lives of homosexual persons."'22 There was no justification offered
by the state, including its claimed purpose to defend traditional
morality, that could justify the burden imposed by the law. Then
the Court summed up the problem with the Texas Homosexual
Conduct law in language that could well have fit in its animus
cases: "The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime."l23
In Lawrence, the Court ruled that the state could not impose a
majoritarian moral code on homosexuals. It could not "demean
their existence or control their destiny" by driving them away from
relationships. Homosexuals, the Court observed, enter relation-
ships for the same reasons heterosexuals do: to share intimacy with
a partner, to show affection and obligation, to have and raise chil-
dren, to establish a place they call home and people they call family.
Lawrence was a Due Process Clause case involving a substantive-
liberty claim, not an Equal Protection Clause decision demanding
equal treatment for classes of citizens. But the Court noted that
the equal protection argument against anti-gay laws like the Texas
statute was "tenable" and that the principles are "linked." The
Court wanted to be sure that neither Texas nor any other state
could reenact a sodomy law applying facially to heterosexuals and
homosexuals under the guise of "equality," for such a law would
continue to impose stigma on homosexuals.' 24
121 Id at 575.
122 Id.
'2s Id at 578.
124 Id at 575.
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The Court's concerns about the "dignity" of gay people and
their right to be respected by their government are the type of
concerns at the heart of animus jurisprudence. That the law "de-
meaned" and stigmatized them through collateral injury without
a legitimate justification is a close cousin of the concerns expressed
in the animus principle. If the Court had followed the equal pro-
tection route,'2 5 Lawrence could very easily have been among the
most prominent anti-animus decisions.
B. THE WINDSOR INSTALLMENT
All of this formed the jurisprudential backdrop for the demise
of the Defense of Marriage Act. Forty years of case law developing
a constitutional bulwark against legislative animus and a genera-
tion of greater constitutional protection for the rights of gay men
and lesbians caught DOMA in a double pincers.
Windsor is primarily an equal protection decision heavily influ-
enced by concerns about structural federalism as an important
guarantor of liberty. After all, what was the "liberty" at stake under
the Fifth Amendment? The Court pointed out that the govern-
ment treated as "unlike" what New York treated as "alike" in a
federal law that was "designed to injure" the class."' At least since
Bolling v Sharpe, the liberty in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause "contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws."' 2 7
In Windsor, the Court held that dignity was denied insofar as
DOMA denied equal federal recognition of same-sex and oppo-
site-sex marriages. The Court held that "by seek[ing] to injure"
married same-sex couples DOMA "violates basic due process and
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Govern-
ment."128 The very purpose of DOMA was to ensure that same-
sex marriages would be treated as "second-class," said the Court,
which is what raised "a most serious question under the Consti-
"' In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor did rely on equal protection to strike
down the Texas law. Id at 579 (O'Connor, J, concurring). At the same time, she suggested
that traditional morality might justify a law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Id
at 585 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
"' United States v Windsor, 133 S Ct 2675, 2692 (2013).
"2 Id at 2695, citing Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 499-500 (1954).
28 Id at 2693.
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tution's Fifth Amendment."' 29 The effect was to "identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal."3 o
The final substantive section of Justice Kennedy's opinion, Sec-
tion IV, directly addressed the animus issue.' Quoting Moreno,
the Court stated the basic anti-animus principle: "The Consti-
tution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group."'3 2 The opinion
devoted the next four pages to explaining why the majority be-
lieved animus was present in DOMA. The Court concluded with
this statement of its holding:
[T]he principal purpose and necessary effect of this law are to demean
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the
Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a
deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.13 3
As the Court had just spent four pages explaining, a purpose to
"demean" a class is a purpose to inflict a dignitary injury on them,
even apart from any more concrete injury. The problem with such
a purpose is that it is a species of animus. It was, for reasons the
Court had just adumbrated, the principal congressional purpose
driving the passage of DOMA. The equal protection principle
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment's liberty guaranty, like the
Fourteenth Amendment's own Equal Protection Clause, forbids
such a purpose. Therefore, DOMA was unconstitutional. This was
as close to a plain statement of the Court's holding in Windsor as
can be found in the opinion. It leaves room for future development
in constitutional doctrine in any number of directions, but for
now its clearest import is that DOMA was found unconstitutional
because it reflected impermissible animus. Justice Scalia, in dissent,
agreed that "the real rationale of [the Windsor opinion] is that
DOMA is motivated by 'bare ... desire to harm' couples in same-
2' Id at 2693-94.
13 Id at 2694.
"' Id at 2693-95.
.3. Id at 2694, quoting Moreno, 413 US at 528.
"3 Id at 2695.
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sex marriages."'" Lower courts have also read Windsor as based
on a finding of unconstitutional animus.'"
That's the comparatively easy part of understanding Windsor.
The harder task is discovering why the Court concluded that
DOMA reflected animus. Since Congress did not issue a statement
of its "desires" when it passed the act, much less admit a bare
desire to harm certain people, this conclusion must rest on some-
thing other than what Congress directly said about why it has
passed the law. There must be circumstances where, no matter
how Congress or its lawyers formulate the legislative purpose, the
Court will see some purposes as malign where Congress says they
are benign or as pretextual where malicious purposes are evident.
When might that be?
Section IV of Windsor suggests several indicia of animus. The
first, drawn from Romer, is that "'discriminations of an unusual
character' especially require careful consideration."'" A departure
from the usual substantive approach toward an issue that targets
a politically unpopular group "is strong evidence of a law having
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.""' Here is
where the usual federalism-based approach to marital status played
a crucial role. Against the backdrop of federal deference to state
choice in family relations, DOMA was suspicious. An extraordi-
nary and unprecedented act requires an extraordinary and un-
precedented justification apart from the self-justifying desire to
demean or injure a stigmatized class of people. Yet since states,
not the federal government, were historically entrusted with the
"defense of marriage" the desire of the federal government to
"defend" it against the states' choices was anomalous.
Linked to the abandonment of deference to state marital de-
terminations was Congress's acknowledged desire to discourage
state experimentation in a field where states in fact had long been
laboratories of experimentation on everything from the legal ob-
ligations of spouses to the dominance of males over females to
"' Id at 2709 (Scalia, J, dissenting). Justice Scalia warned that the animus rationale
would inevitably lead to the invalidation of state laws excluding same-sex couples from
marriage. Id. The Federal District Court in Virginia drew upon Justice Scalia's conclusion
in holding that the state marriage laws reflected "prejudice" against gay people. Bostic v
Rainey, 2014 WL 561978, *17, *21 (ED Va).
"s Bishop v United States, 2014 WL 116013, *18 (ND Okla).
136 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693, quoting Romer, 517 US at 633.
"3 Id.
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divorce. In none of these other profound changes in marriage had
Congress acted to defend the traditional understanding of the
institution. The Court approvingly quoted from the federalism-
based decision by the First Circuit, which concluded that the fed-
eral goal was "to put a thumb on the scales and influence a state's
decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws.""' That is,
Congress was not concerned with simply defining the limits of
federal programs touching marriage but acted with the "purpose
to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about who
may be married.""' In this, Congress was partly successful, as post-
Windsor developments have shown. Three states-New Jersey, Il-
linois, and Hawaii-that granted civil unions to same-sex couples
but resisted marriage before Windsor quickly moved toward mar-
riage in part because of persuasive arguments that civil unions had
no federal status, were entitled to no federal benefits, and thus
could not grant full equality.o None of this interference with
state choice could be written off as merely the "incidental effect"
of an otherwise valid law.
Second, the Court argued that the legislative history and text
of DOMA demonstrated the congressional desire to interfere with
the "equal dignity of same-sex marriages" conferred by the states.
It then pointed to sections of the House Report that explicitly laid
out the congressional purpose "to defend the institution of tra-
ditional heterosexual marriage," to prevent the "radical" redefi-
nition of marriage to include "homosexual couples," to "express
moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality," and to emphasize "traditional moral teach-
ings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws." This purpose
to interfere with state choice in a matter reflecting the dignity of
same-sex marriages was, the Court determined, evident in the very
title of the act.14 '
Third, the Court noted that in practice and in principal effect
"' Id at 2693, quoting Massachusetts v United States Department of Health and Human
Services, 682 F3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir 2012).
139 Id.
" See Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, 2d Special Sess, 2013 Hawaii Sess Laws
1; Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, Ill Public Acts 098-0597; Garden State
Equality v Dow, 82 A3d 336 (Superior Ct of Nj 2013).




the act reflected animus because of its Romer-like scope. It was "a
system-wide enactment with no identified connection to any par-
ticular area of federal law." It injected "inequality into the entire
United States Code," simultaneously excluding a particular class
of married couples from more than one thousand regulations and
statutes governing estate taxes, Social Security, housing, criminal
sanctions, copyright, veterans' benefits, access to health care, and
bankruptcy protection. This broad effect, the Court concluded,
could not be seen as designed to promote a non-animus-based
purpose like "governmental efficiency" in the administration of
federal programs.14 Congress can enact discrete statutes that affect
marital rights in order to serve limited purposes like preventing
sham marriages intended to evade immigration laws.'M But the
effect of DOMA was cradle-to-grave: from increasing the cost of
health care for families raising children to prohibiting couples
from being buried together in veterans' cemeteries.
Fourth, there was no legitimate congressional purpose that
"overcomes the purpose and effect [of DOMA] to disparage and
to injure" married same-sex couples "whom the State, by its mar-
riage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity."" That
is, whatever legitimate purpose might be hypothesized for DOMA
could not really explain its passage. Given the considerations the
Court cited, including the devastating impact of DOMA on gay
families, the best way to understand the law was as an expression
of animus.
These considerations led the Court to conclude that DOMA
was an assault on the dignity and social status of married same-
sex couples. "The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States," the Court
asserted.'4
By this dynamic DOMA undermines both the public and private sig-
nificance of state-sanctioned marriages; for it tells those couples, and
all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of
federal recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable po-
42 Id at 2690, 2694.
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sition of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans
the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects,
see Lawrence, and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.'"
Then, in perhaps the most striking passage in the entire opinion,
Justice Kennedy invoked the interests of children being raised by
same-sex couples:
And it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for
the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family and its concord with other families in their community and in
their daily lives.'4 7
In 1986, in Bowers v Hardwick, the Court had declared that there
was no connection between homosexuality and family life.
Lawrence declared that moral condemnation of homosexuality was
no longer a legitimate state interest. In Windsor, the Court rec-
ognized explicitly for the first time that same-sex couples were
raising children and that their families shared values and interests
(a "concord") with more traditional families.
The use of the word "humiliates" to describe DO1A's injury
to children whose families had been excluded from the protection
of federal law was unusual and especially poignant. The humili-
ation passage calls to mind the words from Brown v Board of Ed-
ucation about the effect of public-school segregation on children:
"To separate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'" Indeed,
it is hard to find a decision apart from the racial discrimination
cases in which the Court has used such strong language to de-
nounce a law.
It is safe to assume-in fact the record shows-that Congress
gave absolutely no weight to the needs of gay couples or their
children when it passed DOMA. Until recently, the Court re-
marked, "many citizens had not even considered the possibility"
1' Id at 2694 (citations omitted).
147 Id.
" Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 494 (1954). The analogy to racial discrim-
ination becomes even clearer given the Court's conclusion that DOMA created "second-
class" or "second-tier marriages" (memorably termed "skim-milk marriages" by Justice
Ginsberg at oral argument).
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that same-sex couples might want to be married.'49 But when states
did begin seriously to consider the idea, they saw "the urgency of
this issue for same-sex couples." Slowly at first and then more
rapidly states realized that excluding same-sex couples from mar-
riage was "an injustice that they had not earlier known or under-
stood."so Recognizing same-sex marriages thus "reflects both the
community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the mean-
ing of equality.""' In contrast to Congress's blunderbuss action
directed at an unpopular minority, states' recognition of these
marriages reflected a considered and thoughtful decision-making
process.
Windsor thus further elaborated upon the anti-animus doctrine.
It laid out the twin concerns of that doctrine to protect both
practical and dignitary interests. It announced a series of factors
that should go into the determination of whether the legislature
has acted with malice toward a class, including deviations from
usual substantive considerations governing a decision, the legis-
lative history and language of a statute, the practical effect of the
statute, and the comparative explanatory weakness of non-animus-
based justifications for the act. An animus-based law, the Court
suggested, is likely to be a product of a legislature that is hostile
to the interests of a class. A more deliberative and conscientious
process, one not blinded by fear and loathing, is more likely to
yield new insights and increased understanding of them.
C. ANIMUS AND DEMOCRATIC-CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Animus is inconsistent with the premises of a well-functioning
representative democracy, and violates the basic constitutional pre-
cept that every person is entitled to equal protection of the laws.
Animus disserves the liberal and democratic values that undergird
our constitutional system. But to accept this liberal and democratic
principle is not to determine how it should be enforced. That
requires some additional discussion of the appropriately limited
role of courts in enforcing it. A response is also needed to critics
who complain that the anti-animus doctrine disrespects those who
" Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2689.
Iso Id.
' Id at 2692-93.
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believe deeply in traditional marriage without malice toward gay
people.
1. The anti-animus doctrine in principle. The Constitution does
not simply preratify all majoritarian decision making by setting
up a representative process for passing legislation. Otherwise,
there would be no need for provisions beyond the structural ones
of democratic representation in a House and Senate and the pro-
cedural ones of bicameralism and presentment. In numerous pro-
visions, the Constitution bounds governmental decision making
by principle. Certain choices are impermissible, completely taken
off the table, even if Congress thinks the reason for making that
choice is compelling and even if the choice is overwhelmingly
supported by the public.
The Constitution presumes that "even improvident decisions"
will eventually be corrected by the democratic process.'52 But that
is only a presumption. There are decisions arrived at democrati-
cally for which the opposite presumption should be indulged: the
political process is not self-correcting in some kinds of cases, or
at least should not be expected to be self-correcting. The mech-
anisms of democracy do not always work in a way that accounts
for all relevant interests.s 3 This is most clearly seen in cases in-
volving race.
Legislative classifications based on race (or alienage or national
origin) are presumptively unconstitutional because they are rarely
relevant to legitimate (i.e., non-animus-based and nonracist) pub-
lic interests. They "are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-
a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or de-
serving as others.""' Such discrimination is "unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means" precisely because the prejudice be-
hind the classification blocks any self-correction. The very antip-
athy that gave birth to the classification helps to sustain it and to
inhibit meaningful reexamination. The legislature is unlikely to
revisit the issue because its members do not see a problem in the
classification, or perhaps regard its animus-based vices as virtues.
Equal protection cases often involve legislative denials of equal
dignity. In Brown v Board of Education,' the demeaning nature of
152 Cleburne, 473 US at 440.
's' United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938).
11 Cleburne, 473 US at 440.
'" Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954).
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racial segregation in education informed the Court's understand-
ing of why equal protection was important, of what was at stake
in the denial. It is central to equal protection jurisprudence that
the government cannot create castes of citizens because creating
a second-class status is itself a harm to their dignitary interests.
It would have been no answer in Loving v Virginia to say that the
state was required to recognize a separate civil-union status for
interracial couples with all the rights, but not the status, of mar-
riage. That's because the separate recognition itself would be an
unconstitutional insult to them. At the very least, the affront to
their dignity more completely informed what harm they suffered
in being denied equality. That harm cannot be a material purpose
of the government.
A law that purposefully inflicts injury on its targets out of sheer
disdain for them is the classic case of malice. Under the consti-
tutional conception of equal protection, a deliberative democracy
should restrict the reasons for which legislators pass laws to those
reasons that are consistent with the recognition of other citizens
as equals.s' "To disadvantage a group essentially out of dislike is
surely to deny its members equal concern and respect, specifically
by valuing their welfare negatively," argued John Hart Ely.'" As
Judge Posner concluded:
If a law is challenged as a denial of equal protection, and all that the
government can come up with in defense of the law is that the people
who are hurt by it happen to be irrationally hated or irrationally feared
by a majority of voters, it is difficult to argue that the law is rational
if "rational" in this setting is to mean anything more than democratic
preference. And it must mean something more if the concept of equal
protection is to operate, in accordance with its modern interpretations,
as a check on majoritarianism.' 5
One might argue that legislatures pass laws out of this type of
animus all the time. It is naive to suppose that it can be entirely
cleansed from the legislative process. Consider some examples of
1s6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism 430-31 (Columbia, 1993).
Is? Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 157 (cited in note 2).
'" Milner vApfel, 148 F3d 812, 817 (7th Cir 1998). To the extentJudge Posner suggested
that hatred must be the sole justification in order to strike down a law based on animus,
he erred. In no case has a city, state, or federal government entity conceded that animus
was the sole motivation, and yet the Supreme Court has now found impermissible animus
in four constitutional decisions. My suggestion, see below at Section m.C.3, is that courts
should ask whether animus materially influenced the decision.
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government action that might be thought to reflect animus. We
create punitive sex-offender registries-perhaps because we're ir-
rationally disturbed by sex offenders. We adopt policies that permit
harsh treatment of terrorist suspects-perhaps because we hate
terrorists. Partisan legislatures redistrict to disempower the other
side-perhaps out of malice toward the other political party. A
majority of the state legislature might pass a regulation that pun-
ishes a business that made campaign contributions to the mi-
nority-perhaps to express ill will. Yet courts do not say that these
laws are unconstitutional on animus grounds. Why not?
There are several responses to this kind of objection to the anti-
animus principle. Some of the acts just mentioned may transgress
limits imposed by other constitutional doctrines, like the First
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. In the abstract, a leg-
islature might plausibly be thought to have acted based on animus
against those targeted by a law (for example, convicted sex of-
fenders or suspected terrorists). But whether a court should in-
validate the law on that ground would depend on consideration
of the objective factors laid out in Section UI.A. These deal with
text, context, process, effects, and pretext. Something that simply
has a whiff of animus should not on that basis be invalidated.
Courts can no more eradicate all spiteful and vindictive motives
from legislators' minds than we can cleanse a human heart of lust
or jealousy. Analysis of the objective factors is a necessary check
on judicial adventurism. The constitutional anti-animus principle
is actually a lot narrower than just a general prohibition on animus.
Further, some of these examples may well be defended by rea-
soned, public-interest justifications that do not rest principally on
animus. Considering the objective factors for invalidating animus-
based action, a court would need to ask whether there was a rea-
soned, public-regarding basis (a basis apart from blind fear, rage,
or hatred) for the government's act. In most cases, there will be
such a basis even though we might suspect that animus played a
role. The equality tradition does not mean that everyone must
always be treated the same. Felons, including sex offenders and
terrorists, are an unpopular and even hated group, but they are
justifiably treated differently from others. Suspected terrorists may
represent an ongoing threat to life and national security. Acting
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to deter and punish crime is not in itself an expression of imper-
missible animus.'5
But the equality tradition does mean at least three things, even
when it comes to the way we treat reviled people. First, the state
must have non-animus-based reasons to support its measures
against the group. The broader the disability the less trustworthy
the state's asserted purpose. Second, reasons once thought to ex-
press a permissible moral judgment may, by the advance of positive
knowledge about the group, be justifiably recast as impermissible
animus. Third, exclusion of a group from common legal benefits
and protections cannot be permitted to present a threat to the
very idea of political community embodied in the precepts that
undergird a liberal democracy.
Applying these principles to the example of felons, the state has
ample justifications aside from simple spite to take measures that
disadvantage the group. The advance of positive knowledge about
felons has not exposed disapprobation of them as mere animus.
Finally, punishment of felons does not undermine the basis for
political community; such punishment defends the community
from actions by felons that would undermine it (through violence
and theft, for example).
But we cannot legitimately punish people who commit crimes
in an effort simply to injure them because we dislike them or
harbor untutored prejudices about them. Inflicting injury on a
group of people cannot be a material objective of the law. The
fact that they are hated and feared does not mean that we can do
anything we want to them. When the severity of the punishment
cannot plausibly be justified by rational penal concerns, a court
might well find a violation of equal protection (or of the Eighth
Amendment). For example, a law prohibiting sex offenders who
have paid their debt to society from ever holding a job or marrying
would seem to fit this description. These are very broad disabilities
that would be poorly connected to reasoned, public-regarding ra-
tionales. They seem based on disgust. We are grossed out by some
people. We loathe them and want to lash out against them. Such
laws would seem to violate the anti-animus doctrine, which is
rooted in the idea that the state may not deny equal protection
of the law to any person and instructs us that hating others, no
' Inmates of Suffolk County fail v Rouse, 129 F3d 649, 660-61 (1st Cir 1997).
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matter how badly they've behaved, is not a legitimate reason by
itself to legislate against them.
The loathing of persons that concerns the anti-animus principal
is different in kind and degree from the political and business
interests often at play in politics. Legislative districting, for ex-
ample, is notoriously complex and is characterized by a give-and-
take among many competing political interests and concerns.
Courts are hesitant to enter that thicket for good institutional
reasons. But even redistricting is not immune from judicial review
and is unconstitutional if it is the product of impermissible pur-
poses under the Equal Protection Clause.6 o
Animus doctrine addresses the deeply problematic potential of
a democratic republic to consistently oppress a politically unpop-
ular minority, a concern articulated in Carolene Products. As Ely
wrote, the political process "is undeserving of trust" when "rep-
resentatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a preju-
diced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest."'' There are
limits on what we can do to people that can be found in substantive
constitutional doctrines and that, under the anti-animus principle,
can be found in the very idea of equal protection.'62
2. The anti-animus doctrine in constitutional framing. The anti-
animus doctrine has roots in the views of the Framers, as well as
in the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of the "equal protection of the laws.""' In The Federalist, James
Madison warned against measures that limit a group's ability to
" See generally Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900 (1995); Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993).
16' Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 103 (cited in note 2).
162 Aside from malice, a second form of animus might be called "malign neglect"-a
total disregard for the interests of a group of people where harm to them may not be the
object of the law, but significant injury to them is the heedless by-product of the law. Such
disregard fails to treat members of the group with the concern and respect that is due all
citizens as equals. "[T]he duty of representation that lies at the core of our system requires
more than a voice and a vote," wrote Ely. "No matter how open the process, those with
most of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of others,
or otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account." Id at 135 (emphasis added). A
violation of equal protection principles sometimes involves "the unconscious failure to
extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and
care, given as a matter of course to one's own group." Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv L Rev 1, 7-8 (1976), quoted in Koppelman, Why
Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn DOMA (cited in note 4). The idea of malign neglect
as a species of animus is interesting, but ultimately beyond the scope of this article.
'6' For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Dale Carpenter, A Conservative Defense of
Romer v. Evans, 76 Ind L J 403 (2001).
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bring about change through ordinary political processes.16 Mad-
ison worried about the development of "factions" animated by
hostility.' Consider his comments in The Federalist No. 10:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to
a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united or actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the com-
munity. 66
The Constitution was intended to correct an intolerable situation
that had arisen under the Articles of Confederation, Madison con-
tended. "[M]easures are too often decided, not according to the
rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the su-
perior force of an interested and overbearing majority."'16 He con-
tinued: "To secure the public good and private rights against ...
such a [majority] faction, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
to which our inquiries are directed."' The object of the Con-
stitution was, in Madison's view, to render the majority "unable
to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. "169
On one level, Madison's definition of faction might be thought
to encompass virtually all democratic decision making, since every
decision is necessarily the product of a legislative (or voting) ma-
jority motivated sufficiently to act in some fashion. Often, the
democratic result will be detrimental to the interests of an iden-
tifiable group within the polity.
But ordinary democratic decision making cannot have been
Madison's principal concern since the Framers wanted to make
self-government possible and lasting. Rather, Madison focused on
the idea that the faction is driven by a "passion," or an "impulse,"
to such an extent that it becomes "overbearing" and seeks to en-
force "schemes of oppression." Madison was concerned about non-
deliberative decision making, a characteristic of animus-based leg-
64 Federalist 51 (Madison) in Roy P. Fairfield, ed, The Federalist Papers 161-62 (2d ed
1966).
16' Federalist 10 (Madison) in Roy P. Fairfield, ed, The Federalist Papers 16-20 (2d ed
1966).
166 Id at 17 (emphasis added).
167 Id at 16.
"' Id at 19-20.
169 Id at 20.
4]1
228 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
islation. That is, he was concerned with decisions that result from
a pure desire to oppress, an unreasoned backlash against a group,
produced not by any studied weighing of alternatives and interests
but by demagoguery and invective.
Madison's views were echoed across the Atlantic in the work of
Edmund Burke. Burke, writing roughly contemporaneously with
the Framers, also warned of the dangers of majoritarian power in
a democracy. "Of this I am certain," he wrote, "that in a democracy
the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel
oppressions upon the minority whenever strong divisions prevail
in that kind of polity, as they often must. . . .""o Minorities so
targeted by a majority "are deprived of all external consolation,"
he observed."' "They seem deserted by mankind, overpowered by
a conspiracy of their whole species."l72
Like Madison, Burke believed that representative government
was not merely the exercise of raw power. It was also not simply
the expression of popular will. Rather, he saw representative gov-
ernment as a matter requiring the interaction of the popular will
and the legislators' own independent judgment. As he explained
to his Bristol constituents in his acceptance speech upon election
to Parliament in October 1774: "If government were a matter of
will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior.
But government and legislation are matters of reason and judg-
ment, and not of inclination. . . .""' Further, Burke posited the
existence of a general welfare upon which representatives had a
duty to act. He therefore shared Madison's disdain for faction-
dominated politics."' In his acceptance speech, Burke character-
ized his vision of the deliberative role of government in a fashion
that Madison would have understood and approved:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
17 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 143-44 (ed Thomas H. D.
Mahoney) (Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981).
". Id at 144.
172 Id.
"' Letter from Edmund Burke to John Farr and John Harris, Esqrs. Sheriffs of the City of
Bristol on the Affairs of America at 187 ("Letter to the Sheriffs") (April 3, 1777), in Edmund
Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches 186, 205 (ed Peter J. Stanlis 1963).
'17 Madison and Burke would likely have disagreed on how to discourage unreasoned
factionalism. Burke was an early advocate of political parties, which Madison distrusted.
For his part, Burke would have been dubious of Madison's mechanistic system of checks
and balances. I am indebted to Ernest Young for pointing out these differences.
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interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate,
against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative
assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole-where
not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general
good, resulting from the general reason of the whole."'
Burke objected most vehemently to Parliament's partial sus-
pension of the Habeas Corpus Act because it operated only against
some citizens, those who had been out of the realm for a prescribed
time, rather than against all. Presaging the rationale for the struc-
tural protections of minorities built into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Burke wrote:
[I]t is never the faction of the predominant power that is in danger:
for no tyranny chastises its own instruments. It is the obnoxious and
suspected who want the protection of the law; and there is nothing to
bridle the partial violence of state factions but this-"that, whenever
an act is made for a cessation of law and justice, the whole people
should be universally subjected to the same suspension of their fran-
chises."" 6
The problem, as Burke saw it, was that under the selective pro-
visions of the act "the lawful magistrate may see particular men
with a malignant eye.""'
By the middle of the nineteenth century it was clear that the
original constitutional design had failed to prevent the majority
from effecting "schemes of oppression" against minorities, espe-
cially the enslaved black population in the South. The Civil War,
and the constitutional amendments that followed it, arose partly
from a desire to correct this abuse of power.
Addressing the concerns of Madison and others about the abuse
of power by aroused majorities, the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
plicitly forbade states to "deny to any person . . . the equal pro-
tection of the laws.""' In a proposed joint resolution for the Four-
teenth Amendment, Charles Sumner argued that the amendment
would abolish "oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly with par-
ticular privileges and powers.""1 7  Senator Howard (R-MI), floor
"s Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov 3, 1774), online at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl 3s7.html.
176 Burke, Letter to the Sherff at 191 (cited in note 173).
' Id.
"7 US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
'" Balkin, 106 Yale L J at 2313, 2348 (cited in note 4), quoting Cong Globe, 39th
Cong, Ist Sess 674 (1866).
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manager of the Fourteenth Amendment, argued that it would
"abolis[h] all class legislation.. . . and [do] away with the injustice
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another."'s
The men who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
could not have anticipated that their work would one day be used
to invalidate legislation excluding same-sex couples from marriage.
But the text they wrote and adopted expresses a broad protection
of "any person" and impliedly incorporates a norm of respect for
all individuals in government decision making. To respect that
norm, legislation must have some substantial justification beyond
"we don't like you," "we couldn't care less about you," or "we just
want it that way."
3. Limited judicial role. One could accept the anti-animus prin-
ciple as a good rule for legislatures and other governmental de-
cision makers without accepting that courts should have any role
in enforcing it. Indeed, under anti-animus doctrine, courts have
only a limited role in policing legislative actions.
Animus has been the minimalist alternative to more substantive
decisions in each of the Supreme Court cases in which it has been
found. It does not rely on adventurous theories of constitutional
substance, like the existence of some hitherto undeclared funda-
mental right or special scrutiny of judicially selected classifications.
These substantive approaches assume a great deal more consti-
tutional certainty about the ultimate ends of law than is often
warranted by the facts of given cases. Anti-animus doctrine is more
concerned with legislative process than with legislative results. It
allows the legislature more freedom to pursue chosen ends in ways
that it deems appropriate, but seeks to ensure that democratic
bodies choose those ends and means in a way that seriously and
nonmaliciously accounts for relevant interests.
Consider that Moreno did not declare a fundamental right to
food stamps, or protect a right of unrelated people to live together,
or expand the nebulous unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or
recognize a new category of besieged minorities (hippies) for
whom special judicial solicitude is always required. It just said that
Congress cannot do whatever it wants to do to them in order to
" Id, quoting Cong Globe, 39th Cong, Ist Sess 2766 (1866). For a more complete
discussion of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind
Constitution 74-75 (Harvard, 1992).
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hurt them. Cleburne, similarly, was limited in its reach. It did not
elevate judicial scrutiny of classifications based on cognitive dis-
ability, an alternative holding that would have led to judicial su-
pervision of virtually all mental health laws and restrictions. It
simply said that a city must have better reasons to single out
cognitively disabled people than the mere fact that others in the
community fear and dislike them. Romer did not mandate that
states and cities must protect gay men and lesbians from discrim-
ination or declare that classifications based on sexual orientation
always warrant heightened scrutiny, a holding that would imme-
diately have called into question all marriage laws and the ban on
military service by openly gay people codified under "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."'
Windsor, too, should be seen as comparatively minimalist. It was
perhaps the least aggressive or theoretically ambitious route the
Court could have taken in striking down DOMA. The other main
contending arguments for the Court's attention-heightened scru-
tiny under equal protection doctrine or under fundamental-rights
analysis, or the kind of rational-basis-with-bite review employed
by several district courts post-Windsor'8 2-would have left the
Court no principled choice but to invalidate the laws of thirty-
seven states that had failed to recognize same-sex marriages. That
is not to say these alternative arguments for a constitutional res-
olution are groundless. It is only to say that if there is any room
left for democratic evolution on the issue of same-sex marriage,
an animus holding offers a better chance of that than any of the
leading alternatives would have.
The doctrine is not concerned as much with the legislature's
substantive conclusion (limiting marriage to one man and one
woman) as it is with the kinds of considerations (desire to harm
the disadvantaged group) that materially influenced the outcome.
Even evidence that some legislators harbored and acted upon an-
imus in supporting or sponsoring legislation would not, by itself,
be enough to invalidate the law. It is likely that any legislative
body, and certainly an electorate the size of California's, would
act with a multitude of purposes in mind. Some of these might
involve animus, but others might not. It is also possible that a
... Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 10 USC § 654, repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal
Act of 2010, Pub L 111-321, 124 Stat 3515, 3516, 3517.
82 See, for example, Kitchen v Herbert, 2013 WL 6697874 (D Utah).
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marriage law might be defended as rationally advancing some min-
imally legitimate purpose. These questions remain after Windsor.
The mere fact that a group has repeatedly lost in the political
arena would not be enough to show that it was the target of hateful
purposes in a particular challenge. The anti-animus principle
should be used sparingly, and only in extraordinary cases, where
analysis of the objective factors leaves little doubt that the outcome
reached by the democratic decision maker (for example, a zoning
board, a legislature, or voters) was the product of animus.
There remains the question, which the Court has not squarely
addressed, of the degree to which animus must be found to have
played a role before governmental action should be invalidated.
The Court's rhetoric has at times suggested that it will strike down
an act where expressing animus was the government's sole purpose
("a bare . . . desire to harm. . . .").' At other times, as in Windsor,
it has suggested that animus need only be the principal (primary)
reason for the act ("the principal purpose and the necessary effect
of this law are to demean . . . .").18 At yet other moments, the
Court has suggested that a weighing of purposes should be per-
formed ("no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure.").185
A quantitative approach is not practical. If the equal protection
interests in recognizing individual worth and in ensuring that gov-
ernmental acts have some substantial justification grounded in rea-
son explain why we have an anti-animus principle, it should be
enough to show that animus materially influenced the outcome."
That means that an impermissible degree of animus would be
found when it was a substantial factor in passage, rather than the
sole factor. But it must also be more than simply one of the things
that might have motivated some members of the legislature or
other governmental actor.
Even with these limitations, three objections against judicial
oversight of legislative animus might still arise. One would note
" Moreno, 413 US at 534.
Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2695.
Id at 2696 (emphasis added).
116 The "material influence" standard is suggested by John Hart Ely. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust at 138 (cited in note 2). Under this standard, animus does not have to be the sole
or primary purpose of the law to violate the anti-animus principle. It's enough that animus
was a substantial factor in the outcome.
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that the kind of multifactored inquiry called for by anti-animus
doctrine is prone to judicial abuse, is difficult to apply even when
not abused, and is indeterminate even when faithfully applied.
These are substantial concerns. But judgments of the kind called
for by the doctrine are also endemic to constitutional law, neither
more nor less beyond the capacity of federal courts than deciding
whether a case is justiciable,'" whether a regulation constitutes a
taking of private property, whether particular commercial speech
can be regulated, and indeed, in equal protection jurisprudence,
whether a classification should be subject to strict scrutiny re-
quiring that the means be sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to
achieve "compelling" ends. What are these if not hybrids of legal
and policy determinations, indeterminate but not unbounded?
Commentators who need certainty are in a Sisyphean struggle
against all of constitutional law. Constitutional law is painting a
picture, not doing a sum."'
A second concern would object to any judicial inquiry into leg-
islative purpose. Criticism of purposive approaches to statutory
and constitutional law is common,' and justifies caution by
courts. But it's untrue that the Court never considers, or ought
never to consider, legislative purpose in constitutional cases. In
fact, it has repeatedly done so, especially in equal protection cases,
where the government's decision to select people for deprivations
is based on race, religion, or even simply dislike.o If-based on
... Indeed, difficult justiciability questions of standing and genuine adverseness were
raised in the two same-sex marriage cases the Court decided the same day, with results
that were not obviously consistent. Compare Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2688-89 (controversy
over DOMA is justiciable even though the parties agreed on the merits and on the remedy),
with Hollingsworth v Perry, 133 S Ct 2652, 2667-68 (2013) (controversy over state con-
stitutional amendment is not justiciable where the parties agreed on the merits and on
the remedy).
'" "Life is painting a picture, not doing a sum." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Address
to the Harvard Alumni Association to the Class of '61, in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speeches
96 (1913).
' Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217, 224-2 5 (1971) (asserting the difficulty and "futility"
of judicial inquiry into legislative motive).
" Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 137 (cited in note 2); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Supreme Court
Review 95 (answering criticisms of difficulty, futility, and impropriety in judicial inquiry
into governmental motive). Equal protection cases authorizing judicial inquiry into leg-
islative purpose or motive include Personnel Administrator of Mass v Feeney, 442 US 256
(1979) (decision maker cannot choose course of action because of, rather than despite,
adverse discriminatory impact); Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 US 252, 266-67 (1977) (listing factors for determining presence of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose); Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976) (racially discriminatory
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textual, contextual, procedural, and effectual considerations-an-
imus appears materially to have influenced the government's act,
the purpose is an unconstitutional one. Add to that the absence
of a plausible alternative explanation (as opposed to a pretextual
one), and the animus motivation is both obvious and constitu-
tionally fatal.
A third concern about judicial inquiry into possible animus-
based purposes is that it is ineffective. The Court has occasionally
noted a seeming oddity in purpose-based constitutional analysis.
[T]here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law
because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down
for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it
would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant gov-
erning body repassed it for different reasons.
Despite this criticism, the Court continues to inquire into gov-
ernmental purpose in a host of constitutional fields. The objection
to purpose-based constitutional analysis is not unique to the an-
imus doctrine.
The fact that the government might subsequently act for a con-
stitutionally permissible purpose after having acted for an imper-
missible one is not a decisive objection to purpose analysis. It's
possible that a legislature, after being told that it acted for an
impermissible purpose, will refuse to vote for reenactment. If a
law is invalidated by a court, the legislature will often fail even to
purpose would invalidate facially neutral law); Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886) (stark
racially disparate effect showed racially discriminatory purpose). In the Establishment
Clause context, the Court has held that a law passed to promote fundamentalist Christianity
was unconstitutional, Epperson v Arkansas, 393 US 97, 107-09 (1968) (invalidating a state
law that forbade teaching evolution in public schools), that a law requiring "equal time"
for the teaching of creation science and evolution in public schools had an improper
purpose to advance religion, Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 588 n 7 (1987), and that
legislative history could be reviewed to find an unconstitutional preferentialist purpose in
a case involving a "religious gerrymander" targeting practitioners of the Santeria faith,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 535 (1993). Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has held that states may not act with a protectionist
purpose in regulating businesses, see, for example, Bacchus Imports Ltd. v Dias, 468 US
263, 276-77 (1984) (invalidating state tax law on imports that had a protectionist purpose).
A facially neutral law is unconstitutional if the Court nevertheless discerns a protectionist
purpose-one that discriminates against out-of-state interests. Indeed, even a law that
could be reenacted today for a permissible purpose has been held unconstitutional because
it was originally motivated by an unconstitutional purpose. Hunter v Underwood, 471 US
222, 233 (1985) (invalidating 1901 state constitutional provision disenfranchising felons
that had been motivated by a desire to disenfranchise blacks, even though felons could
be denied the right to vote for some other purpose today).
"' Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971).
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consider the issue again. The passage of time, by itself, may allow
the legislature to consider new evidence or to reevaluate what it
previously did in haste. In fact, "judicial action on the basis of
motive results in an effective, not a futile, invalidation."'9 2 So let
the legislature find a reason other than disempowering black voters
for drawing a city's boundaries as a twenty-eight-sided figure.'
Let the school board close down all of its schools again for some
purpose other than separating black and white schoolchildren.'
For that matter, let the zoning commission find some reason other
than animus against the cognitively disabled for uniquely denying
them a home. Let the Congress cleanse the legislative record of
vindictiveness against nontraditional families in order to deny
them assistance to buy food.
In many cases, there simply won't be an alternative legitimate
explanation for the challenged action.195 The reasons that led a
court to conclude that the initial action was based on animus will
"rightly make it somewhat skeptical of claims of a subsequent
change of heart."'9 6 The existence of a legitimate justification will
also likely have been considered in the initial judicial review. The
fact that animus was nevertheless found will make it less likely
that the non-animus-based justification might save it after reen-
actment. The more plausible objection to purpose inquiry is not
that it is futile, but that it may be far too censorious and thus far
too effective as a tool for invalidating government action.
Beyond the practical concern about futility, there is nothing
unusual or wrong in principle about declaring that an act properly
done for one reason may be impermissible if done for another
reason. Ely observes:
[Sluppose from time to time an action previously invalidated for un-
constitutional motivation is retaken and upheld: so what? We don't
regard the system as having failed when a person whose conviction was
reversed because the jury was biased is reconvicted by a jury on remand:
indeed we regard it as vindicated.19 7
192 Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 52 NYU L Rev 36, 116 (1977).
" Gomillion v Ligbtfoot, 364 US 339, 340 (1960).
'" Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218 (1964).
's Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 138 (cited in note 2).
16 Id.
'" Id at 139.
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When it comes to fears of excessive judicial intrusion, the upshot
is that very few litigants will successfully use the animus doctrine.
Most laws can plausibly be explained as reasonably related to le-
gitimate objectives, with little or no indication that spite materially
produced the act. The Eighth Circuit, for example, appropriately
rejected an animus attack on a city ordinance prohibiting outdoor
smoking on public property.' The public-regarding health jus-
tifications for such an ordinance were plausible even if not a slam
dunk; the law was not the product of a bare desire to harm smokers.
The Sixth Circuit was right to reject an animus challenge to a
Kentucky law that accelerated the date at which the issuers of
travelers' checks were required to remit unclaimed funds to the
state.'9 9 The Eleventh Circuit correctly held that Congress's de-
cision to deny food stamps and supplemental security income ben-
efits to some classes of aliens, but not others, could plausibly be
explained by factors other than animus: the need to save money,
the desire to reward aliens who had been working for a long time
in the United States, the need to assist those who were particularly
vulnerable to poverty (like the blind and disabled), and the desire
to help refugees seeking to escape catastrophic political and eco-
nomic conditions.20 0 Judge Posner, writing for a panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit, justifiably rejected an animus attack on a federal law
that denied social security disability benefits to persons who had
been confined to mental health facilities after being acquitted of
a crime by reason of insanity.20' They did not need the money
and were already "subsisting at the state's expense," he reasoned.2 02
None of these cases implicated the basic concern of the anti-
animus principle that a governmental decision maker should have
reasoned justifications, and should not act based on ill will toward
a group of people.
4. Animus and the morality of homosexuality. Numerous academic
and nonacademic critics, especially, but not only, opponents of
same-sex marriage, have excoriated the Court for allegedly in-
sulting those who supported DOMA. These critics have protested
'" Gallagher v City of Clayton, 699 F3d 1013, 1020-21 (8th Cir 2012).
" American Express Travel Related Services Co. v Kentucky, 641 F3d 685, 691-92 (6th Cir
2011).
2" Rodriguez v United States, 169 F3d 1342, 1351-53 (11th Cir 1999).
201 Milner v Apfel, 148 F3d 812, 816-17 (7th Cir 1998).
202 Id at 817.
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that they are not anti-gay bigots and that a moral belief in marriage
as an opposite-sex-only institution should not be equated with
hatred of homosexuals. These criticisms miss the mark when it
comes to Windsor, which is more complicated on the subject of
morality-as-animus than they suggest.
a) Windsor as insult. After Windsor, Professor Hadley Arkes
described the opinion as "hate speech" in the National Review. For
Justice Kennedy, Arkes wrote, "the defense of marriage was simply
another way of disparaging and 'denigrating' gays and lesbians,
and denying dignity to their 'relationships."' Plausible justifica-
tions for marriage as the union of one man and one woman were
to be viewed as "so much cover for malice and blind hatred." 2 0 3
Echoing Chief Justice Roberts's dissent, Professor John Yoo la-
mented in the National Review that the Court had damned 342
members of the House, 85 Senators, and President Bill Clinton
as "all guilty of antigay bias in 1996, when DOMA was enacted."2 0 4
Writing in Commonweal, Professor Richard Garnett warned that
the animus rationale threatened religious freedom:
We should be concerned that the characterization by the majority in Wind-
sor of DOMA's purpose and of the motives of the overwhelming and
bipartisan majority of legislators that supported it reflects a view that those
states-and religious communities-that reject the redefinition of marriage
are best regarded as backward and bigoted, unworthy of respect. Such a
view is not likely to generate compromise or accommodation and so it
poses a serious challenge to religious freedom.2 05
Professor Patrick Lee wrote that "[the] strident campaign to re-
define marriage will only become more intense in the next few years.
20 Hadley Arkes, Worse Than It Sounds, and It Cannot Be Cahined, Bench Memos (Na-
tional Review Online, June 26, 2013), online at http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/352114/worse-it-sounds-and-it-cannot-be-cabined-hadley-arkes. Longtime anti-
gay activist Robert Knight agreed that "[bly accusing backers of traditional marriage of
being motivated only by animus against homosexuals, the U.S. Supreme Court has become
the most prominent hate group in the country." Robert Knight, The High Court Gleefully
Defamed Christians, GOPUSA (Washington Times (DC), July 2, 2013), online at http://
www.gopusa.com/freshink/2013/07/02/the-high-court-gleefully-defamed-christians/.
2 John Yoo, Windsor: Tarring "the Political Branches with Bigotry," The Corner (National
Review Online, June 26, 2013), online at http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352098/
windsor-tarring-political-branches-bigotry-john-yoo. Justices Scalia and Alito first
sounded this alarm about Windsor in their respective dissenting opinions. Windsor, 133 S
Ct at 2707 (Scalia, J, dissenting); id at 2718 (Alito, J, dissenting).
20s Garnett, Worth Worrying About? (cited in note 29).
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)206Catholics will be increasingly labeled as bigots and hate mongers.
From now on, warned Rod Dreher in The American Conservative,
"the Court has declared open season on religious and social con-
servatives and their institutions." The decision should "put fear into
the hearts of anyone who does not share the belief that homosex-
uality is morally neutral, or morally good. The Supreme Court says
we are haters, full stop."207
Similar criticisms could have been leveled at the Court for using
the anti-animus rationale to strike down food-stamp limitations in
Moreno. That law, too, was defended as reinforcing the normative
value of traditional families. The denial of a permit for a home for
the cognitively disabled in Cleburne was based on neighbors' fears.
For that matter, the prohibition on all civil rights protections for
homosexuals in Romer was defended as a measure to stave off the
piecemeal deterioration of traditional sexual morality.
Windsor does not actually label DOMA supporters bigots. It does
not even claim that any particular legislator harbored animus against
gays, although malice toward homosexuals was a significant driver.
Can this be? Professor Michael Greve, calling Windsor "transpar-
endy absurd," scoffed at the idea that DOMA was "a product of
an 'animus' that no one may have had but that, like a devilish spirit,
worked behind the legislators' backs to produce DOMA[]." 208 That
leads to a consideration of the relationship of morality and animus.
b) Morality and animus. It is true that Windsor declared, for
the third time in seventeen years, that moral disapproval of ho-
mosexuality is an illegitimate basis for legislation fencing out ho-
mosexuals. Supporters of DOMA claimed that morals legislation
is good for people, that homosexual acts are immoral, and that
nobody is better off when people engage in homosexual acts. That
is not a bare desire to harm anyone, they say; it is a desire to make
206 Patrick Lee, Is Marriage Bigoted and Discriminatory?, The Catholic World Report
(July 20, 2013), online at http://www.catholieworldreport.com/Item/2431/is-marriage
bigoted-and discriminatory.aspx.
207 Rod Dreher, Scalia: "Open Season on Marriage Traditionalists," The American Con-
servative (June 26, 2013), online at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/
scalia-doma-open-season/. Another commentator opined that "Christians who speak out
and stand up for traditional marriage are more likely than ever to be persecuted and even
prosecuted for it." Paul Strand, Open Season on Christians after Pro-Gay Rulings, CBN News
(July 30, 2013), online at http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2013/July/Open-Season-on-
Christians-after-Pro-Gay-Rulings/.




men moral,209 which makes them good, which helps them. A sod-
omy law criminalizing homosexual acts might even be good for
homosexuals, on this account.
This argument has not fared well in the animus decisions. Col-
orado defended Amendment 2 on moral grounds. Texas defended
its Homosexual Conduct Law on moral grounds. Congress de-
fended DOMA on moral grounds. Yet all three laws were held
unconstitutional. One's views enforced in law do not get a con-
stitutional pass simply because one affixes a "morals" or "natural
law" tag on the product. Decorating it further with one's inter-
pretation of biblical passages cannot save it from review. To con-
clude otherwise is to say that a law is constitutional as long as a
majority wants it that way and expresses its desire as based on
morality.
It's also the case that animus doctrine, like much of constitu-
tional law, has a normative component. It expresses the normative
principle, implicit in equal protection and in the postulates of a
liberal democracy, that every individual has dignity and is worthy
of respect. It offers the observation that unreasoning prejudice
against persons expressed in law is inconsistent with the commit-
ment to the equal protection of the law. Government must not
act maliciously to injure or disparage them and must not act as if
their interests are unworthy of any consideration.
What we call morality is guided by experience. Morals reflect
human learning and history. They evolve. They adjust. They are
critiqued and revised. Experience and empirical learning about
murderers have not taught that we should not condemn murder
or fear the murderer's potential for future harm. Moral judgments
often arise from an unstated and complicated calculation about
harm. Not every law prohibiting or limiting some activity for what
are said to be moral reasons reflects animus against the people
who engage in it. One might condemn as immoral the possession
of guns, or running a casino, or using marijuana. That doesn't
make every effort to ban guns, to prohibit gambling, or to crim-
inalize drug usage a product of animus against gun owners, gam-
blers, or drug users. Each of these enactments would have a plau-
sible connection to concern about harm independent of ill will
toward the people who engage in these acts. None of these pro-
" See generally Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality
(Clarendon, 1995).
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hibitions would run a serious risk that they were simply expressions
of spite against the people who engage in the prohibited behavior.
When experience and empirical learning demonstrate that the
feared harm undergirding a "moral" view is baseless, a continued
moral condemnation expressed in law is likely to be an animus-
based act. It is a prejudice, an unthinking and anachronistic hold-
over from an earlier time. Such unfounded negative prejudgments
cannot be a permissible basis for government action if we really
mean what we say about respecting individual worth and dignity.
To take a person's citizenship seriously entails a willingness to
learn about him, to adapt our attitudes, and to modify our treat-
ment of him as we learn.
The moral condemnation of homosexuality has typically rested
on hysterical claims about homosexuality-claims rife in the con-
gressional debate over DOMA-that have turned out to be base-
less. Experience and empirical learning have demonstrated that
hoary myths about homosexuals as sick, maladjusted, contagious,
subhuman, dangerous, and predatory were baseless. Same-sex cou-
ples have the same capacities and desires for love, affection, and
commitment as opposite-sex couples. At the same time, laws aimed
at homosexual "conduct"-whether that conduct is intimate sexual
activity or the formation of relationships-are inseparable from
laws aimed at homosexual status.2 10 The same can't be said of laws
that prohibit, on moral grounds, the conduct of gun possession,
gambling, and drug usage. To condemn homosexual conduct is to
condemn homosexual people in a way that, say, prohibiting slot ma-
chines is not a condemnation of people who overestimate their
chances of winning a game designed to profit from their gullibility.
To say that the moral condemnation of homosexuality enacted
in a broad and unprecedented law like DOMA is impermissible
animus is not the same as saying that all reasons for rejecting
same-sex marriage are animus-based. A legislature may decline to
pass same-sex marriage legislation in circumstances that genuinely
demonstrate no ill will toward gay people, but that instead reflect
uncertainty about the consequences of change to a social and legal
practice as important as marriage. The legislature may prefer to
take things slowly. A general preference for incremental change,
210 Christian Legal Society v Martinez, 130 S Ct 2971, 2990 (2010); see generally Dale
Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas ch 8 (W. W Norton, 2012).
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when other indicia of animus are not present, 211 is surely not an-
imus. The converse is also true: merely reciting a preference for
slow change (or morality) when other indicia of animus are present
can't exempt a law from constitutional attack.
To say that DOMA reflected animus is also not to say that those
who hew closely to the traditional religious understanding of mar-
riage in their own lives and within their own faith traditions are
themselves hateful. Good people can do bad things for what they
think are good reasons. The focus of animus doctrine is not on
the bad nature of the person who supports legislation. The focus
is on the inadmissibility of the reasons offered for supporting the
legislation in a republic committed to the concept of equal pro-
tection for every citizen. The issue in Windsor is not whether a
belief in marriage as only the union of one man and one woman
is bigoted. It is whether, in context, the affirmative decision by
Congress in 1996 to select one class of potential future marriages
for second-class status reflected animus against the persons en-
tering those marriages.
This characterization of the Windsor holding may not ease the
hurt feelings or quiet the indignation of traditional-marriage sup-
porters, of course. The insult to them, if an insult at all, is not
unique to an animus holding, however. An alternative holding
based on heightened scrutiny of sexual-orientation classifications
would have informed them that traditional sexual morality is akin
to race-based discrimination. A rational-basis holding resting on
the irrelevance of the means (denying federal recognition to mar-
ried same-sex couples) to the stated ends (inter alia, encouraging
responsible procreation) would have suggested that they suffered
a serious cognitive failure verging on insanity when they urged
passage of DOMA. There is no nice way to tell people that policies
they have fervently supported are unconstitutional. Nor would
these alternative routes to eliminating DOMA be more solicitous
of religious beliefs.
The animus portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Windsor
played into a calculated strategy by gay-marriage opponents to
claim the status of victims in the debate over the issue. The leading
anti-gay-marriage advocacy group, the National Organization for
Marriage, has even urged that gay-marriage supporters be baited
211 See Section III.
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into calling opponents "bigots" in order to split the coalition of
gays and blacks who work together on other causes.
The strategic goal of this project is to drive a wedge between gays and
blacks-two key Democratic constituencies. Find, equip, energize and
connect African-American spokespeople for marriage, develop a media
campaign around their objections to gay marriage as a civil right, pro-
voke the gay marriage base into responding by denouncing these
spokesmen and women as bigots. No politician wants to take up and
push an issue that splits the base of the party.212
It should be no surprise, then, that the immediate reaction of
DOMA supporters to Windsor was to claim that they had been
unfairly called bigots by the Court. Supporters of Colorado's
Amendment 2 similarly cried foul when the Court in Romer struck
down that patently anti-gay enactment because it reflected animus.
They were simply "tolerant Coloradans" who didn't hate gay peo-
ple but wanted to halt the "piecemeal deterioration" of traditional
sexual morality, protested Justice Scalia.2 13 The Court held oth-
erwise. The fact is that opponents of the Court's decision in Wind-
sor would have objected strenuously to any basis for striking down
DOMA. Their real complaint about Windsor lies in its substantive
conclusion, not in its supposed disrespect toward Congress, Pres-
ident Clinton, and the millions of Americans who backed the law.
It is to that substantive conclusion that we now turn.
III. DOMA AND ITS ANimus
Critics of Windsor have charged that the Court found an-
imus in DOMA "without any evidence on the matter."214 The
criticism seems to be that Justice Kennedy magically divined an-
imus in the decision to pass DOMA. Or perhaps he simply believed
that there was no conceivable rational basis to define marriage
solely as the union of a man and a woman, and thus "found" animus
as the only remaining explanation for why the law passed. At first
glance, only bald assertion rather than reasoned analysis or "evi-
dence" is used to reach the result.
212 Kevin Nix, Breaking: Previously Confidential Documents Shed Light on NOM Strategy,
Human Rights Campaign (March 26, 2012), online at http://www.hrc.org/nomexposed/
entry/must-read#.UvUeyPIdWSo.
" Romer, 517 US at 636, 653 (Scalia, J, dissenting).




But as a close reading of Windsor and its predecessor animus
decisions indicates, a variety of objective factors should be con-
sidered to determine whether animus infected governmental de-
cision making. These include considerations of text, context, leg-
islative procedure and history, actual effects, and pretext.
This section lays out the basic components of the Court's meth-
odology in animus cases. It then applies that methodology to the
Defense of Marriage Act, concluding that the Court correctly held
that DOMA reflected animus.
A. ANIMUS METHODOLOGY
In equal protection cases, the Court has teased out impermis-
sible purposes where governmental decision makers (including
legislatures) have claimed permissible ones. In race cases, the im-
permissible purpose is the purpose to discriminate on the basis of
race. In animus cases, the impermissible purpose is the purpose
to inflict injury or indignity. While the Court hasn't systematically
laid out its methodology, based on the racial-purpose cases and
the animus quadrilogy we can discern an approach for determining
when an unconstitutional purpose has materially driven govern-
mental decision making despite the government's argument that
it hasn't.
Consider the Court's equal protection methodology in racial
discrimination cases. "Necessarily," the Court has held, "an in-
vidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another."2 15 A law's
disproportionate racial effect is relevant, but usually not sufficient,
to show a racially discriminatory purpose. There is no requirement
that the discriminatory purpose be the only conceivable one.
"Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the
'dominant' or 'primary' one."216 The racial purpose need only be
"a motivating factor in the decision" to support the conclusion
that the action is unconstitutional.2 17
21s Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 242 (1976).
216 Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 US 252, 265 (1977).
217 Id at 266.
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Whether an invidious purpose was "a motivating factor" can be
inferred from "such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available."21 8 This indirect evidence may include con-
sideration of the "impact" of the official action, the historical back-
ground of the decision, the "specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision," departure from normal procedures
for making a decision, departures from substantive considerations
that would usually drive the result, and "the legislative or admin-
istrative history," including "contemporary statements by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or re-
ports."2 19 Once there is a threshold showing of an impermissible
purpose, the burden shifts to the government to "establish[] that
the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered."2 20
The Court has repeatedly struck down laws that were facially
neutral on the grounds that they reflected a racially discriminatory
purpose. It invalidated a state law redrawing the boundaries of a
city by altering the shape "from a square to an uncouth twenty-
eight sided figure," removing all but five black voters from the
city's election rolls while keeping all white voters within city
boundaries. 22 ' A decision by a school board to close all of the
public schools was struck down on the grounds that the purpose
of the closure was to prevent blacks and whites from going to
school together, even though the district might have been able to
close the schools for other reasons. 2 2 It struck down an at-large
election system that had effectively prevented any blacks from
being elected in a Georgia county where 53.6 percent of the pop-
ulation was black.2 23 It also struck down a facially neutral law that
disenfranchised all persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude.22 4 Under this law, adopted as part of the Alabama Con-
stitution in 1901, ten times more blacks than whites had lost the
right to vote. The constitutional convention had purposefully "se-
lected such crimes as vagrancy, living in adultery, and wife beating
219 Id.
219 Id at 267-68.
220 Id at 270 n 21.
221 Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 340 (1960).
222 Griffin v County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218 (1964).
223 Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613 (1982).
12 Hunter v Underwood, 471 US 222, 233 (1985).
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that were thought to be more commonly committed by blacks."22 5
None of these laws created classifications based on race, but all
were unconstitutional because of their impermissible racial pur-
poses.
In the past four decades, an analogous methodology has grad-
ually developed in animus cases. In these cases, the invidious and
unconstitutional purpose is not racial, but animus-based. Animus
is a desire to disparage and to injure a person or group of people.
As in the race cases, the government rarely concedes that it acted
because of animus against a person or group of people-indeed,
such a purpose is disclaimed. Instead, the government often char-
acterizes the harm done to one class as merely an effort to benefit
a different class. Or the government justifies the harm inflicted as
an effort to encourage socially optimal behavior while not en-
couraging, or perhaps even discouraging, suboptimal or harmful
behavior. In a given case, which characterization of the govern-
ment's purpose, the government's own benign characterization or
the challenger's malign one, should the Court credit?
Under the anti-animus doctrine, the Court need not accept
either characterization as the sole or dominant explanation for the
government's act. It is possible that the government's act could
be characterized accurately as involving both benign and malign
purposes. But that mix does not save it from unconstitutionality.
As in the race cases, the impermissible animus-based purpose need
not be the "sole" or "dominant" one. It need only be a "motivating
factor," or as I propose, a "material influence" in the decision. As
in the race cases, the impermissible purpose may be gleaned from
circumstantial and direct evidence.
The inference that animus was a material influence in the gov-
ernment's decision is drawn from a totality of the evidence rather
than from a mechanical rule. A number of factors should be con-
sidered in making this inference. The animus decisions, especially
Windsor, taken together with the racial-purpose decisions, suggest
that these factors include consideration of:
1. the statutory text (textual);226
2. the political and legal context of passage, including a historical
background demonstrating past discriminatory acts, and a de-
22s Id at 232.
226 See Romer, 517 US at 624; Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693.
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parture from the usual substantive considerations governing the
decision, especially if the considerations usually relied upon by
the decision maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the
one reached (contextual);22 7
3. the legislative proceedings, including evidence of animus that
can be gleaned from the sequence of events that led to passage,
the legislative procedure, and the legislative history accompa-
nying passage (procedural);22 8
4. the law's harsh real-world impact or effects, including injury
to the tangible or dignitary interests of the disadvantaged group
(effectual);229 and
5. the utter failure of alternative explanations to offer legitimate
ends along with means that really advance those ends (pretex-
tual). 230
From a consideration of these factors, an animus-based purpose
may be inferred even where it is not admitted. The Court's animus
cases show that no single one of these factors must be present in
order to make the inference. The factors may be used to evaluate
decisions made by a legislature,2 3' by a popular vote,232 by an ad-
227 See Moreno, 413 US at 537-38; Cleburne, 473 US at 448; Romer, 517 US at 623-24;
Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693-94; see also Arlington Heights, 429 US at 257-59.
229 See Moreno, 413 US at 536-57; Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2694-95. Citing Windsor and
the other animus decisions, a Michigan district court relied on legislative history to con-
clude that the state's denial of benefits to same-sex domestic partners was rooted in animus.
Bassett v Snyder, 951 F Supp 2d 939, 968 (ED Mich 2013) ("The historical background
and legislative history of the Act demonstrate that it was motivated by animus against gay
men and lesbians."). See also Arlington Heights, 429 US at 268 (inquiring into legislative
history to find racial purpose).
22. See Romer, 517 US at 627-28; Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693-95. See also Washington,
426 US at 242 (consideration of law's disparate impact). The Court has not explained
why a law's harmful impact is a sign that animus motivated its passage. It may be that
the Court believes the Congress is likely to have intended the tangible and dignitary
damage the law actually inflicted. This may or may not be true in a given case. Congress
might not have foreseen or given any thought to the negative impact. But in the case of
DOMA, which purposefully affected thousands of provisions in the United States Code,
the idea that Congress couldn't have foreseen any consequences is hard to credit. Congress
at the very least had constructive knowledge of the consequences. In the case of DOMA,
evidence of impact is thus the kind of evidence from which an inference about purpose
and motivation can be drawn.
230 See Moreno, 413 US at 537; Cleburne, 473 US at 449-50; Romer, 517 US at 635;
Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693-94. Concern about using pretext to justify an unconstitutional
act is as old as McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 423 (1819) (Congress may not accomplish
an unconstitutional objective under the pretext of using its constitutional powers).
131 Moreno, 413 US at 529 (evaluating a federal statute); Windsor, 113 S Ct 2682 (eval-
uating a federal statute).
23 Romer, 517 US 620 (evaluating a statewide referendum).
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ministrative body,2 33 or by any other governmental official or en-
tity.234 The animus-based purpose may be found in government
acts that are very broad235 or very narrow.2 36
The fifth factor-consideration of the government's non-ani-
mus-based justification for the act-deserves special attention. In
the race cases, the fifth factor comes into play as a burden-shifting
exercise: when a prima facie case of impermissible racial purpose
is made the burden shifts to the government to explain its decision
on nonracial grounds.2 37 In the animus cases, this factor has played
out somewhat differently: consideration of the strength of the
government's non-animus-based justification is a part of what goes
into the ultimate determination of whether animus was a materially
motivating purpose behind the government's act.
When other indicia of animus are present, the fifth factor is
more demanding and operates differently than traditional rational-
basis review. If a mere "rational" relationship to a "legitimate"
purpose were all that was required in animus cases, each of the
four animus decisions would have come out the other way because
the government's act in each could be justified on some far-fetched
and hypothetical ground. In Moreno, the desire to save money
could have rationally explained the denial of food stamps to hip-
pies. In Cleburne, concerns about 500-year floods could have jus-
tified the denial of a zoning variance for a home for the cognitively
disabled. In Romer, an attempt to conserve state resources for
combatting other forms of discrimination could have saved
Amendment 2. And in Windsor, Congress's asserted preference for
moving slowly on social change or its efforts to control its own
spending programs would have prevailed in a challenge to DOMA.
But they didn't.
Ordinarily, a poor fit between means and ends could be ex-
plained by many things other than animus: bad information, stu-
pidity, or excessive caution. But it's obvious that the Court is not
23 Cleburne, 473 US 436-37 (evaluating the decision of a city zoning board).
234 Davis v Prison Health Services, 679 F3d 433, 438 (6th Cir 2012) (government acting
as employer); Stemler v City of Florence, 126 F3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir 1997) (government
as prosecutor).
235 Romer, 517 US at 624 (denial of all civil rights protections); Windsor, 113 S Ct at
2682-83 (exclusion from status and all benefits of marriage under federal law).
236 Moreno, 413 US at 529 (denial of food stamps); Cleburne, 473 US at 435 (denial of
special use permit for housing).
237 Washington, 426 US at 241; Arlington Heights, 429 US at 270 n 21.
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always willing to indulge the presumption that Congress was
merely incompetent rather than hateful. And it's not willing to
tolerate wildly over- or underinclusive laws once animus is de-
tected. That's because, for the Court, the presence of animus has
what we might call a tainting effect. In animus cases, the Court
does not simply declare that a discovered malicious purpose is
"illegitimate" and that Congress must find an alternative "legiti-
mate" one. It does not just take one proffered justification off the
table and then ask the government, "What else have you got?"
The discovery of animus is instead an affirmative reason to in-
validate an otherwise constitutional law.
By the time the Court reaches consideration of possible pre-
text-the relationship between the asserted (non-animus-based)
objective and the means used to serve that objective-it has already
been alerted to the strong possibility that the permissible expla-
nation is makeweight or pretextual. The fact that proffered in-
nocuous rationales in the animus quadrilogy failed suggests that
the usual presumption of constitutionality was no longer operative.
Windsor Products thus draws from Carolene Products, in which the
Court concluded that the presumption of constitutionality should
not apply where the political process could not be trusted to deal
fairly with unpopular minorities.
B. INDICIA OF ANIMUS IN DOMA
We come at last to the application of anti-animus doctrine and
methodology to DOMA. Each of the factors the Court has con-
sidered in its decisions, when applied to DOMA, indicate that
animus materially influenced Congress's act. The Court's decision
in Windsor did not fully flesh out the arguments that might have
been made to support its conclusion, but the skeleton of the ar-
gument is there.
1. Text. The text of a given statute is a starting point for iden-
tifying its objective purpose or purposes. Windsor concluded that
the very text of DOMA indicated animus,238 though it is a bit
puzzling why the text alone should be thought to indicate that.
Perhaps it was the breezy combination of breadth and brevity in
the act that suggested a congressional inattention to serious class
interests or any consideration of narrower means for achieving
238 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693.
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non-animus-based congressional objectives, like cost savings or
discouraging judicial activism.
The text of the act did lay bare its scope and purpose. Though
not challenged in the Windsor litigation, Section 2 of the act might
get the suspicion of animus started. Section 2 dealt with the pos-
sibility that married same-sex couples might some day in the future
demand interstate recognition. It declared that no state could be
required to recognize any other state's same-sex marriages. 239 It
was the first time Congress had ever made such a declaration about
the effect of one state's laws in the other states, which itself rep-
resents a departure from the usual substantive approach governing
full faith and credit practices. Why the exception to recognition
for the first time here?
Section 3, which was challenged, declared that Congress would
not recognize otherwise valid same-sex marriages. It limited mar-
riage for all federal purposes to the union of one man and one
woman.2" It brushed away any possible morsel of federal recog-
nition or regard for any future marriage validly entered between
two men or two women under state law.
Beyond the sweeping text, the title of the law, the "Defense of
Marriage Act," immediately raises three questions. First, against
what or whom is the law a "defense"? What is the threat and how
has it been generated? Second, assuming there is a hypothetical
future invader armed with weaponry capable of bringing down the
entire institution of marriage, why must the "defense" be a Great
Wall running up and down the continent rather than a moat
around a specific and vulnerable fortification? Third, since when
is the Congress charged with "defending" marriage? That has been
the states' responsibility, with Congress acting only interstitially
or at the margins. The text cannot answer these questions, but it
at least introduces the problem.
Under this analysis, the suspicion of animus would grow as the
text of the law itself broadens and as it points away from usual
areas of congressional concern. A law defining marriage as the
union of one man and one woman for a much more limited pur-
pose identifiable in the text, like determining household eligibility
29 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 28
USC § 1738C.
240 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 1
USC § 7.
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for food stamps, would not generate quite the same degree of
concern that a shotgun law like DOMA generated.
A similar lesson might be applicable to state limits on marriage.
For example, state constitutional amendments regarding marriage
that have been passed since the late 1990s lie along a spectrum
from (1) enactments empowering the legislature to decide the
definition of marriage without intrusion by state courts,24 1 to (2)
bans on the status of marriage for same-sex couples but that leave
open the possibility of benefits and rights for same-sex couples
through an alternative status like civil union or domestic part-
nership,242 to (3) bans on any status "identical" to or even "similar
to" marriage for same-sex couples, denying them any marriage-
like benefits. 24 3 The text of some state marriage amendments, like
the one in Virginia, even suggest the possibility that private con-
tracts and benefits conferring rights on same-sex couples might
be unenforceable. 2'4 Not coincidentally, the broader the textual
sweep of the marriage limitation, the more burdensome the law
is likely to be in effect.
2. Context. The political and legal context in which the gov-
ernment acts may suggest an animus-based purpose. DOMA was
both a departure from the nation's substantive adherence to fed-
eralism and the latest in a series of governmental acts discrimi-
nating against gay men and lesbians. It departed from the usual
presumption of federalism that allows states to control basic family
relations, including the recognition of marital status. It also de-
parted from historic practice under which the federal government
plays a minimal, distinctly secondary, and derivative role in family
policy. Departures from the usual substantive considerations in
decision making indicate possible animus, especially when the
usual substantive considerations would likely have produced a dif-
ferent result. Windsor reaffirmed what is now a venerable principle
of constitutional law by emphasizing that discrimination of an
241 See Hawaii Const, Art I, § 23. Note that the Hawaii state legislature had denied
marriage to same-sex couples in 1994, see Section 3 of Act 217, Reg Sess, 1994 Hawaii
Sess Laws 531, but later decided to extend marriage to same-sex couples. See Hawaii
Marriage Equality Act of 2013, 2d Special Sess, 2013 Hawaii Sess Laws 1.
242 See, for example, Ariz Const, Art XXX, § 1; Miss Const, Art XIV, § 263-A; Mo
Const, Art I, § 33.
243 See, for example, Neb Const, Art I, § 29; Okla Const, Art II, § 35; Tex Const, Art
1, § 32; Utah Const, Art I, § 29.
244 Va Const, Art I, § 15-A.
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unusual sort raises judicial suspicion that some impermissible pur-
pose was afoot.245
But DOMA was also the perpetuation of a different and largely
discredited historical practice: the tradition of treating gay people,
and in this case specifically gay relationships, as at best unworthy
of serious consideration and, at worst, as a threat from which the
country and its institutions must be "defended."
a) Departure from usual substantive considerations:
federalism. The Windsor decision placed heavy emphasis on the
fact that DOMA was a departure from the usual practice of fed-
eralism in family law, and especially in the recognition of marital
status.2" The classic statement of federalism in family law, quoted
many times since by the Court, came in 1890: "The whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United
States."24 7 It's not that Congress has never legislated on the subject
of family law. It has done so in numerous ways, including the more
than one thousand rights and benefits that were denied in
DOMA.2 4 8 And it's true that Congress did require states like Utah
to reject polygamy as a condition for entry into the union in the
late nineteenth century.24 9 But the authority of the states to define
marriage, and to have this definition respected and relied upon by
the federal government even in the provision of federal rights and
benefits, is unquestioned. There had never before DOMA been a
single, across-the-board federal definition of marriage. Even the
nineteenth-century polygamy restriction did not purport to con-
245 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 633 (1996).
246 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2692. For a discussion of Windsor's use of federalism, see
Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, Columbia Law Review Side-
bar (Colum L Rev, Oct 2013), online at http://columbialawreview.org/windsor-federalism-
and-family-equality/. States may similarly enact legislation or enforce policies that sus-
piciously depart from the usual substantive rules. After Windsor, a district court invalidated
Ohio's refusal to recognize the plaintiffs' Maryland same-sex marriage for purposes of
issuing a state death certificate, noting that Ohio had never before refused to recognize
a valid marriage from a sister state. Obergefell v Wymyslo, 2013 WL 6726688, *2, *23 (SD
Ohio). This reflected a substantive departure from the state's own historic practice of
recognizing valid foreign marriages even if those marriages could not have been entered
in Ohio, suggesting the possibility of animus.
247 In re Burrus, 136 US 586, 593-94 (1890), quoted with approval in Ankenbrandt v
Richards, 504 US 689, 703 (1992).
. For a detailed discussion of family law and federalism, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Family
Law Reimagined ch I (forthcoming 2014).
24. See Federal Enabling Act, Pub L No 112, 28 Stat 107 (1894).
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strain the states already admitted to the union. As discussed in
Section II.B above, DOMA's sharp departure from this substantive
tradition was a major consideration in the Court's analysis of
whether there was animus behind the law. It is now accepted in
constitutional law that departures from substantive principles or-
dinarily guiding decision makers indicate a possible impermissible
purpose.2 50
Two points are worth emphasizing here. The Court did not
declare that unconstitutional animus will be found anytime Con-
gress departs from traditional federalism. Unless the legislation is
beyond Congress's enumerated and necessarily implied powers,25 '
or otherwise invades some core aspect of state sovereignty,2 52 or
violates some other provision like those protecting individual
rights,2 53 the limits on its powers to legislate are political rather
than constitutional.
While the Court acknowledged the existence of substantial fed-
eralism concerns in Windsor, its holding did not squarely rest on
that ground.254 The anti-animus principle is not another source
of support for state power against federal intrusion. Rather, the
departure from the usual respect for federalism engendered sus-
picion about why Congress acted as it did. It was another indicator,
but not a proof, of animus.
The second and related point is that the departure was from
the usual posture of deference by the federal government to the
states. Though other factors might point toward animus in a state
ban on same-sex marriages, this particular consideration would
not. It is the states, after all, that have historically exercised the
power to define marriage.
b) Historical background indicating past discrimination:
anti-gay public policy. To identify an invidious purpose in gov-
ernment action, the Court has looked at historical practices in-
250 See Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2697 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting); Arlington Heights, 429 US
at 267.
2" See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 607 (2000); United States v
Lopez, 514 US 549, 567 (1995).
25 See, for example, Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 932 (1997); New York v United
States, 505 US 144, 177, 188 (1992).
253 See, for example, District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 622 (2008).
254 See discussion in Section I.
[2013
WINDSOR PRODUCTS 253
dicating discrimination against the group.2" The sorry history of
this country's legalized discrimination against homosexuals is
striking for the absence of reasoned justifications, for arbitrary
lines between conduct allowed and conduct forbidden, and for a
tendency to use the asserted immorality of homosexual acts to
justify widespread opprobrium of homosexual persons. That his-
tory suggests an unreasoning prejudice or aversion that lies be-
neath the surface of laws shutting out gay people. Even if the
Court has not yet recognized that such a history justifies formal
heightened scrutiny of all classifications based on sexual orienta-
tion, at least it raises a yellow flag alerting the Court to the in-
creased risk of animus.
Through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, every
state had laws prohibiting anal sex, often called in state statutes
"crimes against nature," "sodomy," or "buggery." 25 6 In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, states also began specifi-
cally prohibiting oral sex. Prior to the late 1960s, sodomy laws
applied regardless of the sex of the participants in the act and
regardless of whether the couple was married. A husband and wife
who engaged in oral sex were potentially as guilty as two men who
had anal sex. However, there was little enforcement of the laws
against private sex between consenting adults; and what occasional
enforcement there was fell most harshly on homosexuals.
After the Civil War, cities and states began more aggressively
regulating sexuality.257 Some of the laws enacted during the early
to mid-twentieth century were especially draconian. A 1911 Mas-
sachusetts law allowed the state to incarcerate "degenerates" (in-
cluding homosexuals) and other "mental defectives" for indefinite
periods of time in state mental institutions. More commonly, state
laws called for sterilization or castration of moral degenerates and
sexual perverts, usually for homosexual behavior. In an effort to
"treat" homosexuals, hospitals performed prefrontal lobotomies,
.ss Much of the discussion in the section is drawn from Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct chs
1-2 (cited in note 210). Other sources for a review of the history of anti-gay laws and
social stigma are William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet
328-37 (Harvard, 1999); Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash,
and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford, 2012); and Andrew Koppelman, The Gay
Rights Question in Contemporary American Law (Chicago, 2002).
2S6 Eskridge, Gaylaw at 328-37 (cited in note 255) (App. Al: listing dates of first sodomy
laws for each state, starting in 1610).
"' Id at 27-34.
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injected massive doses of male hormones, and administered elec-
tric shock and other aversion therapy.258
Federal authorities also suppressed homosexuality. They seized
and destroyed obscene publications, excluded immigrants con-
victed of sexual crimes, and barred military service by "degener-
ates,"259 a ban not completely lifted until 2010. U.S. Customs
censored or seized novels depicting homosexuality in a positive
way, including the 1886 edition of The Arabian Nights. Authorities
censored homosexual content from films. 26 0
Immediately following World War II, American society and
government became increasingly alarmed by the spread of Com-
munism, which was linked in the public mind to deviant sexuality.
Between 1946 and 1961 alone, when arrests for violation of sod-
omy laws reached historic highs, the state "imposed criminal pun-
ishments on as many as a million lesbians and gay men engaged
in consensual adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding
hands."2 6 1 Officials often worried that homosexuals, like Com-
munists, were infiltrating and undermining government agencies.
Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) was on the lookout for gov-
ernment officials who tolerated "flagrant homosexuals."2 6 2 The
"sexual perverts," warned one politico, were "just as dangerous as
the actual Communists." In the space of seven months in 1950,
President Harry Truman's administration investigated the alleged
sexual perversion of 382 civil servants, most of whom subsequently
resigned. A government report warned that "[o]ne homosexual
can pollute an entire office." In fact, more State Department em-
ployees were fired for homosexuality than for alleged Communist
sympathies in 1951 and 1952, the height of McCarthy-era red-
hunting. 263
At the same time, states were also cracking down on homosex-
uals. State and municipal laws were enforced to suppress homo-
sexual association, including groups formed to advocate liberali-
zation of sex regulations. States also used professional licensing
25. Id at 42.
2s1 Id at 34-37 (cited in note 255).
2 Id at 47-48.
" Id at 60.
262 David K Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians
in the Federal Government 26 (Chicago, 2004).
263 Eskridge, Gaylaw at 69 (cited in note 255).
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laws to prevent homosexuals from becoming doctors, dentists,
pharmacists, embalmers, guardians, lawyers, teachers, and other
professionals.2 6
State authorities used both direct and indirect methods to shut
down gay bars. Liquor license laws requiring holders to be of
"good character" were used both to prevent gay bars from opening
and to shut them down when they slipped through the system.
States and municipalities closed gay bars through business and
liquor license schemes. A 1954 Miami ordinance, for example,
made it illegal for a bar owner "to knowingly allow two or more
persons who are homosexuals, lesbians or perverts to congregate
or remain in his place of business." This one-homo-per-bar rule
resulted in the closing of all of Miami's gay bars by the late
1950s.265 New York's State Liquor Authority, among others, pro-
hibited bars from serving prostitutes and homosexuals.
Law enforcement authorities aggressively used police stakeouts
at suspected gay bars, decoy operations, and police raids to arrest
large numbers of socializing homosexuals. For example, a 1960
raid on a San Francisco bar resulted in the disorderly conduct
arrests of 103 people for same-sex dancing. Remarkably, when a
serial killer targeted homosexuals in Santa Monica in 1956, police
used details of the killer's confession to start an anti-gay cleanup
of the city.266
Gays reacted to this crusade in part by attempting to organize
politically. Two fledgling gay-rights groups, the Mattachine So-
ciety (mostly men) and the Daughters of Bilitis (women), formed
in the 1950s. Mattachine emerged in Los Angeles in 1950; DOB,
in San Francisco in 1955.267 The FBI closely monitored their ac-
tivities, beginning an internal security investigation of Mattachine
in 1953 and of DOB in 1959. Neither group, of course, repre-
sented a credible national security threat. "Nonetheless," William
Eskridge writes, "FBI agents infiltrated both organizations, ar-
chived their declarations and publications, reported their meetings
and activities, recruited informants, compiled lists of members
264 Id at 72-74.
205 Id at 78-80.
266 Id at 63-65.
267 John D'Emilio, Gay Politics and Community in San Francisco Since World War II, in
Martin Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr., eds, Hidden From History:
Reclaiming the Gay & Lesbian Past 460 (Meridian, 1990).
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whom they could identify, and speculated on the organizations'
influence and future activities." Agents interviewed the staff of the
Mattachine's publication, One, and notified their employers.
Group members met in secret and resorted to using pseudonyms
to protect their identity. Similar monitoring and harassment of
gay groups by state and federal authorities occurred throughout
the country. Police harassment and spying on gay organizations
continued into the 1970s.268 Police raids on gay bars and other
forms of harassment of homosexuals continued well into the 1990s
in some places, including the Lone Star State of Texas.
The case of Texas is illustrative. The state banned gay sex in
1973 in a so-called "homosexual conduct" law, but in the very
same year it legalized heterosexual sodomy, adultery, and even
bestiality. This was nonsense to one Texas appeals court judge, a
Republican and self-described "country lawyer," who had no fa-
miliarity with gay-rights causes. In an interview about the Lawrence
case, he reported that when the litigation reached his court he
wondered how the state could justify a surgically precise ban on
gay sex. "I kept thinking that if they decriminalized all those things
that one would normally say are immoral, then why did they leave
this one in? There had to be a reason," he recalled thinking,
obviously still baffled. "And nobody could explain to me why."269
The Court seemed to acknowledge the history of anti-gay laws
in Romer, when it suggested that homosexuals "needed" the pro-
tection of specific antidiscrimination laws and for that reason con-
cluded that such laws did not extend "special rights" to gays.270
Laws forbidding anti-gay discrimination guaranteed equal rights.
In Windsor itself, Justice Kennedy noted that most Americans had
never given a thought to the possibility of marriage between two
people of the same sex-a literal thoughtlessness, the lack of
thought, about the needs of a class of people.271
DOMA was adopted at a time when gay sex was still illegal in
more than a dozen states, when gays and lesbians were barred
from serving openly in the military, when federal law and all but
a handful of states permitted gays to be fired or denied housing
because of sexual orientation, when a solid majority of Americans
.6. Eskridge, Gaylaw at 75-76, 114 (cited in note 255).
26 Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct at 167 (cited in note 210).
270 Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 631 (1996).
271 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2689.
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believed homosexual relations were immoral, and when there
were-despite the "defense" asserted in the title of the act-no
homosexual marriages or even civil unions to defend against.
While significant progress toward equality under the law had been
made by 1996, that progress was subject to constant and strident
backlash, like the voters' decision to bar all civil rights protections
for gays in Colorado's Amendment 2.
These considerations alone support the view that gays and les-
bians have historically been the target of systemic and legalized
discrimination at the state and federal levels. No federal appeals
court has denied that fact, even though most appeals courts have
refused to treat sexual-orientation discrimination as suspect. Any
legislative or electoral act excluding gays from benefits and pro-
tections available to others comes to the courts with at least this
indicator that animus might be afoot. The fact of such discrimi-
nation is not enough by itself to invalidate the exclusion under
the anti-animus doctrine, for that would turn the doctrine into
simply a stand-in for heightened scrutiny. But it does mean that
every enactment excluding gays faces additional scrutiny because
it carries a large risk that it was materially driven by animus.
DOMA, as a law intentionally excluding gay couples from com-
mon benefits and protections, came to the Court with at least this
factor leaning against it. This is true even before examining the
other factors that, taken together, decisively show animus in
DOMA's passage. This factor would also weigh against a state
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages.
3. Procedure. The process by which legislation is adopted can
also offer clues about whether its adoption was driven by animus.
Evidence of animus in DOMA can be found in the sequence of
events that led to passage, the legislative procedure Congress used
to pass it, and the legislative history accompanying its passage. It
helps answer the question whether decision makers were lashing
out at an unpopular group. It reveals that legislators gave no se-
rious consideration to a more limited imposition on the affected
class. And evidence from the legislative history, including numer-
ous statements by members of Congress, exposes the deeply ma-
levolent attitudes upon which legislators acted against gay couples.
These considerations support the conclusion that DOMA arose
from unconstitutional animus.
a) Expedited passage. From introduction to final passage,
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DOMA was pending for just four months, and much of that ab-
breviated period was consumed by congressional vacation time. It
was moved into committee hearings with just thirty legislative days
left before the 104th Congress adjourned for the fall campaign.2 72
Why the haste? No state or nation had yet recognized gay mar-
riage. There was no impending federal court decision mandating
nationwide recognition of gay marriage. No federal suit had even
been filed, which should not be surprising: Bowers v Hardwick was
still good law, allowing homosexual acts to be criminalized. Only
the Hawaii litigation had even been filed. The trial court had not
begun hearing testimony when DOMA was introduced. A final
decision from the Hawaii Supreme Court was probably at least
two years away.273 The rush to block same-sex couples from the
altar cannot be explained by an actual rush of same-sex couples
to the altar.
There was one impending event for which the hasty passage of
DOMA was exquisitely timed: the election of 1996. This fact was
noted frequently in press reports and during the congressional
debate by Democrats.2 74 Republicans denied any such political mo-
tivation, but did so in a way that hinted at their desire not even
to think about the issue. "Political? I wish I'd never heard of this
issue. This is a miserable, uncomfortable, queasy issue. There's
no political gain, but there is a moral issue.. . . [S]ome of us think
same-sex unions legitimated by the Government trivialize mar-
riage and condone public immorality, and the politics of that are
miserable."275
The unusual speed of Congress's action on DOMA, and its
refusal to study the law's effects or possible alternatives to it, might
27 Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House
Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 37 (1996) (statement of Representative Conyers)
("May 15, 1996 Hearing").
273 This point was made repeatedly by opponents of DOMA, see, for example, Defense
of Marriage Act, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec H7491 (July 12, 1996) (statement
of Representative Skaggs) ("July 12, 1996 Debate"), and was not refuted by supporters.
274 See, for example, id at H7482 (statement of Representative Frank); Defense of Mar-
riage Act, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec S10101 (Sept 10, 1996) (statement of
Senator Kennedy) ("Sept 10, 1996 Debate"). Another large round of marriage bans, this
time at the state level, came during the election season of 2004. See Sarah Kershaw, Gay
Marriage Bans Gain Wide Support in 10 States, NY Times (Nov 3, 2004), online at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/politics/campaign/03gay.html.
.. Markup Session on H.R. 3396, The Defense of Marriage Act, Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 53-54 (May 30, 1996)
(statement of Representative Hyde) ("Markup Session").
[2013
WINDSOR PRODUCTS 259
be defended as a show of unusual efficiency rather than unseemly
purpose. Nobody wants Congress to plod along where it need not
do so. But DOMA's reach was so broad and its implications for
the targeted group so momentous that a more thoughtful and
thorough consideration was called for.
b) Rejection of proposals for study and more limited
application. It's not that leaders in Congress were not presented
with ideas for further study, or for some substantive limit on the
reach of DOMA. Some supporters claimed that DOMA was
needed to limit federal payments to spouses.27 6 "We have enough
problems financing our Social Security trust funds," claimed
DOMA sponsor Jim Sensenbrenner. If DOMA was not enacted,
he warned, "there will be a huge expansion of the number of people
eligible to receive Medicare survivor benefits."27 7 Another House
member said that failure to pass DOMA would "take money out
of the pockets of working families across America" and use that
money to support same-sex marriages, ignoring that same-sex cou-
ples were also part of working families.2 78 All Americans would be
"paying for benefits for homosexual marriages."279 Yet another
wondered whether same-sex marriage might "have an enormous
financial impact on our country."280
But nobody had any idea how much federal recognition of same-
sex marriage would cost, or even whether recognition might save
the federal government money in the long run because more
spouses would be providing care to each other rather than relying
on government services.28 ' The cost of providing benefits to mar-
276 Providing for Consideration of H.R. 3396, Defense of Marriage Act, 104th Cong, 2d
Sess, in 142 Cong Rec H7276 (July 11, 1996) (statement of Representative Largent) ("July
11, 1996 Debate I").
7 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7484 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Sensenbrenner).
278 Id at H7493 (statement of Representative Weldon).
279 Id at 117495 (statement of Representative Lipinski).
280 Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10116 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Bums).
281 In fact, in 2004 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that federal recognition
of same-sex marriage would save the federal government a modest amount of money: in
some cases, recognizing same-sex marriages would increase outlays and revenues; in other
cases, it would have the opposite effect. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates
that on net, those impacts would improve the budget's bottom line to a small extent: by
less than $1 billion in each of the next 10 years (CBO's usual estimating period). That
result assumed that same-sex marriages were legalized in all 50 states and recognized by
the federal government. Letter and Report from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Con-
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ried same-sex couples was repeatedly cited in the congressional
debate as a justification for DOMA, but that cost was never ex-
amined, verified, or even estimated. Supporters acknowledged that
they simply did not know what the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage in one or more states might cost the federal government in
benefits to spouses, but they assumed the worst.28 2 Senator Phil
Gramm speculated that there might be "hundreds of thousands"
of beneficiaries created under federal and state law if same-sex
marriage were permitted, but "no one knows what the number
would be."283 No one knew what any of the numbers would be.
Senator Byrd asked the relevant questions, but had no answers:
I urge my colleagues to think of the potential cost involved here. How
much is it going to cost the Federal Government if the definition of
"spouse" is changed? . . . What is the added cost in Medicare and
Medicaid benefits if a new meaning is suddenly given to these terms?
I know I do not have any reliable estimates of what such a change would
mean, but then, I do not know of anyone who does. That is the point-
nobody knows for sure.2 84
In other words, Byrd's colleagues were to think about something
in the absence of any knowledge or study of it.
One proposal was that, before it was voted upon, DOMA's costs
and benefits should be reviewed and studied in the regular com-
mittee process.28 5 This proposal was summarily dismissed. It seems
that the mere possibility that same-sex relationships might draw
to some extent from public funds at some date in the future was
enough to justify denying them more than one thousand public
benefits-even ones that cost nothing. The interests of same-sex
couples simply did not merit any consideration by Congress.
gressional Budget Office, to Honorable Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm on the Con-
stitution, Comm on the Judiciary 2 (June 21, 2004), online at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21 -samesexmarriage.pdf.
282 July 11, 1996 Debate 1, 142 Cong Rec at H7274 (cited in note 276) (statement of
Representative McInnis).
.83 Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10106 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Gramm).
28. Id at S10111 (statement of Senator Byrd). He then speculated about the cost: "I do
not think, though, that it is inconceivable that the costs associated with such a change
could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions-if not billions-of Federal
taxpayer dollars." Id. The closest anyone came to an estimate of added cost was Senator
Bob Kerrey (D-NE), who calculated that nationwide recognition of same-sex marriage
would add at most 2 percent to the number of marriages in the country. Id at S10124
(statement of Senator Kerrey).




An undecided House Republican offered to vote for DOMA if
it were amended to require that the Government Accountability
Office study the ability of same-sex couples to provide for their
families and protect their relationships. The study was to be com-
pleted by October 1997 and would provide some empirical
grounding for possible further legislative action. While the idea
was initially embraced by DOMA sponsor Representative Henry
Hyde (R-IL), it was rejected in the House Rules Committee and
never made it to the floor. The Congress that gave the nation
DOMA had no interest in studying the real-world hardships faced
by gay families.286
Another idea was that, to the extent the concern was judicial
activism, DOMA could be limited to contexts in which a state
court (rather than the state legislature or the people through a
referendum) had ordered the state to recognize gay marriages.2 87
Yet congressional leaders were undeterred, revealing that concerns
about judicial overreaching were largely makeweight arguments
for something else.
Even as DOMA was justified by a stated desire to defend "tra-
ditional marriage," other proposals to protect lifelong monoga-
mous marriage were summarily rejected. Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO), for example, proposed that the federal defi-
nition of marriage should exclude any subsequent marriage unless
the first marriage was terminated on fault grounds.2 88 This would
have seriously eroded the no-fault divorce revolution that marriage
traditionalists had long said was undermining the institution. It
might also save the federal government a lot of money in benefits
payments. But several sponsors of DOMA were living in their
second or third marriages.28 9 They would have lost federal rec-
ognition under the proposal. Large numbers of their heterosexual
constituents, too, would have lost their own benefits. The idea
was dismissed as a "diversion."2 9 0 Sponsors of DOMA were es-
286 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7492-93 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Gunderson).
297 Id at H7487 (statement of Representative Frank).
288 See July 11, 1996 Debate 1, 142 Cong Rec at H7272 (cited in note 276) (statement
of Representative Moakley); id at H7273 (statement of Representative Schroeder).
" Id at H7274 (statement of Representative Abercrombie) ("Because I understand some
of the people sponsoring this bill are on their second or third marriages. I wonder which
one they are defending.").
290 Id at H7273 (statement of Representative McInnis).
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sentially saying to gay couples: "Traditional marriage restrictions
for thee, but not for me."
c) Legislative history. The Court has been willing to consult
evidence from legislative history to determine whether a law arose
from unconstitutional animus. It did so in Moreno, observing that
members of Congress had openly targeted "hippies" and "hippie
communes" for exclusion from the food stamp program. In his
opinion for the Court in Windsor, Justice Kennedy famously cited
evidence from the legislative history of DOMA to show that it
reflected impermissible animus.2 9 ' This history, he wrote, showed
that denying the "equal dignity" of same-sex marriages was "more
than an incidental effect of DOMA." It was the "essence" of
DOMA, its core purpose.
The House Report announced its conclusion that "it is both appropriate
and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution
of traditional heterosexual marriage. . . . H.R. 3396 is appropriately
entitled the 'Defense of Marriage Act.' The effort to redefine 'marriage'
to extend to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would
fundamentally alter the institution of marriage." H.R. Rep. No. 104-
664, pp. 12-13 (1996). The House concluded that DOMA expresses
"both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality. Id., at 16 (footnote deleted). The stated purpose
of the law was to promote an "interest in protecting the traditional
moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws." Ibid.292
In Windsor, the House Report was the smoking gun of animus.
Former Solicitor General Paul Clement, representing the Bipar-
tisan Legal Advisory Group, did not try to defend the conclusions
or statements in the committee report, but suggested that such
evidence should not be enough for the Court to strike down a
statute.293
But the fact is that the House Report only scratched the surface
of a large mass of similar, and even more hysterical, denunciations
21 Following Windsor, one district court struck down a denial of benefits to same-sex
domestic partners, relying in part on the legislative history of the Michigan law being
challenged. Bassett v Snyder, 951 F Supp 2d 939, 968-69 (ED Mich 2013). Among other
scholarly treatments of animus in the legislative history of DOMA, see Mark Strasser,
DOMA, the Constitution, and the Promotion of Good Public Policy, 5 Albany Gov't L Rev 613,
617-19 (2012).
292 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2693.




of homosexuals and homosexuality in the proceedings to pass
DOMA in the House and Senate. It was the tip of an animus
iceberg. The legislative history leading to passage of DOMA in-
dicated both that many members of Congress were motivated by
deep hostility toward homosexuality and that many others were
completely unconcerned about their interests.294
One can, of course, glean many purposes from the legislative
record. Supporters of DOMA, mindful of the need to argue that
it was not an act of malice against homosexuals, have often con-
jured a sanitized version of the congressional purposes behind the
law. In this narrative, DOMA was not the result of hatred, but of
a prudent caution toward important social change; not a dispar-
agement of gay relationships, but a reaffirmation of the superiority
of moms and dads; not a condemnation of gays at all, but a mild
expression of traditional religious views about sexuality and mar-
riage. Does this happy tale hold up?
According to the legislative record, DOMA's exclusion in 1996
of all married same-sex couples from all federal marital protections
and obligations was intended to:
1. "defend[] and nurtur[e] the institution of traditional, hetero-
sexual marriage,"
2. "promot[e] heterosexuality,"
3. "encourag[e] responsible procreation and child-rearing,"
4. "protect[] . . . democratic self-governance,"
5. "preserve scarce government resources" by preventing marital
benefits from "hav[ing] to be made available to homosexual
couples and surviving spouses of homosexual marriages," and
6. express "moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral con-
viction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality."29 5
Of these, the first, second, and sixth were more or less explicit
condemnations of homosexuality. ("Promoting heterosexuality" is
only a nicer way of condemning homosexuality.) These will be
discussed in more detail immediately below. The third was not
.94 For catalogs of some of this legislative history, see generally Mae Kuykendall, Essay:
On Defined Terms and Cultural Consensus, 13 J L & Pol 199 (1997); and Note, Litigating
the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 Harv L Rev
2684, 2701-04 (2004).
.s Defense of Marriage Act, HR Rep No 104-664, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 12-13, 15, 17-
18 (1996).
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necessarily anti-gay, but was so flimsily served by DOMA that it
is fairly understood as a pretext for underlying hostility. It will be
discussed in Section III.B.5.b below. The fourth was not homo-
phobic but could have been served by a much narrower and less
burdensome law like the proposed alternative, discussed above in
Section III.B.2, denying federal recognition only from states where
same-sex marriage was judicially imposed. The fifth was not ho-
mophobic, but as noted in Section III.B.2, was unstudied by Con-
gress and was unsupported in any empirical evidence. The failure
to consider any alternative to DOMA that might be less injurious
to married gay couples, or to study the law's actual budgetary
effects, strongly suggests that these avowed congressional purposes
were makeweight arguments.
Knowing that the Court had just decided Romer, one of the
primary authors of DOMA tried to inoculate it against consti-
tutional challenge.
[S]aying that marriage means today what it has meant through our
entire history is certainly not a novel idea. . . . [T]here are very clear
legitimate government interests in this legislation. It is not motivated
by animus, but rather a reaction to deliberate efforts by opponents of
heterosexual marriages, being the legal basis for the building block of
our society . . . ."'
This was in fact the very defense offered against animus claims in
the Windsor litigation. But pro forma statements in Congress could
not mask the reality of what happened as the congressional debate
heated up. What follows is a very incomplete catalogue of some
examples of this hostility.
i) Active malice: From the time of its introduction in the House
of Representatives on May 7, 1996, the defense of the Defense of
Marriage Act was characterized by inflammatory rhetoric directed
at gay people and their relationships. Numerous statements by
members of Congress during committee hearings and floor de-
bates evidenced deep hostility.
Many DOMA supporters, in both floor speeches and legislative
hearings, described the effects of same-sex marriage in apocalyptic
and paranoid terms. Allowing same-sex marriage would be a "dis-
astrous policy," warned the chairman of the House Subcommittee




on the Constitution.29 7 Admitting "my bias" for "traditional het-
erosexual marriage," a sponsor asserted without explanation that
same-sex marriage would "derogate it." 298 Same-sex marriage was
an attempt to eliminate the distinction between "what is right and
wrong."299 It was a "frontal attack on the institution of mar-
riage."3" It would "abolish thousands of years of legal tradition"
and "destroy every other State's laws regulating marriage."30' The
country "cannot survive" the "destruction of the family unit" that
gay marriage would cause.30 2 It was nothing less than an "assault
on America's families and the sacred institution of marriage."30 3
It would "destroy thousands of years of tradition."3" These de-
nunciations exploited unsubstantiated fears and stereotypes of gay
people as immoral, subversive, and disproportionately influential
enemies of the country's history and its institutions.
Supporters of DOMA repeatedly condemned homosexual re-
lationships. In many speeches this condemnation was expressed as
an affirmation of "nature," morality, and tradition. "What is at
stake in this controversy?" asked DOMA sponsor Representative
Charles Canady (R-FL) as debate on the House floor opened.
"Nothing less than our collective moral understanding-as ex-
pressed in the law-of the essential nature of the family-the fun-
damental building block of society."3 0' Only opposite-sex marriage
"comports with nature and our Judeo-Christian moral heritage."
At other times the condemnation of gay relationships was more
explicit. Law "should not treat homosexual relationships as the
moral equivalent of heterosexual relationships on which the family
is based. That is why we are here today."o' Same-sex marriages
297 May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 2 (cited in note 272) (statement of
Representative Canady).
29. Id at 32-33 (statement of Representative Sensenbrenner).
2W Id at 36 (statement of Representative Inglis).
3' Id at 37 (statement of Representative Barr).
"0' Id at 75 (statement of Representative Whyman).
302 Defense of Marriage Act, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec H7442 (July 11,
1996) (statement of Representative Hutchinson) ("July 11, 1996 Debate II").
303 Id at H7449 (statement of Representative Packard).
0July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7495 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Lipinski).
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would "demean" and "trivialize" everyone else's marriages.so? Gay
marriage threatened "the moral fiber that keeps this Nation to-
gether" and "the future of families.""'s It would be "the final
straw."309 Such condemnations of homosexuals and homosexuality,
once understood as a profound and positive moral commitment,
are now constitutionally illegitimate as justifications for excluding
gay people from rights and recognition freely given to others.
A debate formally about federal recognition of same-sex mar-
riages easily slipped into open expression of a general disgust to-
ward homosexuality itself, reflecting the underlying animus. Gay
people were described as sick, perverted, and dangerous. "Ho-
mosexuality has been discouraged in all cultures because it is in-
herently wrong and harmful to individuals, families, and societies,"
declared a House member."o Same-sex marriages not only de-
meaned marriage, another argued, but "[t]hey legitimize unnatural
and immoral behavior.""' Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) thundered
that gays "seek to force their agenda upon the vast majority of
the American people who reject the homosexual lifestyle."3 12
DOMA, in Helms's view, was needed to protect marriage and
families against "those who seek to destroy them and who are
willing to tear apart America's moral fabric in the process.""
Members rejected the idea that tolerance should play a role in the
debate. "Tolerance does not require us to say that all lifestyles are
morally equal. It doesn't require us to weaken our social ideals.
... And it should not require special recognition for those who
have rejected that standard.""'
One representative seized on the argument that homosexual
orientation is not consciously chosen as an admission that "it is
307 Markup Session, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 53-54 (cited in note 275) (statement of
Representative Hyde).
30I July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7488 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Stearns).
Id at H7495 (statement of Representative Lipinski).
3o Id at H7487 (statement of Representative Funderburk).
" Id at H7494 (statement of Representative Smith).
312 The Defense of Marriage Act, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec S10068 (Sept
9, 1996) (statement of Senator Helms) ("Helms's Remarks").
3" Id.




not a desirable lifestyle, and there's something wrong with it.""'5
He wanted gays to be "rescued" and "returned to where they can
have a happy lifestyle, because I think it's inherently destruc-
tive."" 6 Supporters read into the Congressional Record an espe-
cially odd denunciation of acceptance for homosexuals: "Overcome
by miasmic gases of diversity and inclusion wafting from the Nine-
ties swamp, we have turned into the Punchdrunk kid, a twitching
lummox with cauliflower ears who mumbles 'Sure, Jake, sure' to
everybody.""'
Senator Nickles (R-OK) invoked stereotypes of gay couples as
sex-obsessed, threatening traditional families by their presence in
polite society so much that landlords should be able to deny them
housing.
[I]f you are saying if a person had 10 apartment complexes and he or
she had rented those out to-I'm going to say traditional families, and
you had a couple of vacancies and you had two homosexual couples
come in with T-shirts that said, "I'm gay and proud of it. Let's make
love," would I want that person to be able to deny renting those two
units? Yes, I think they should have the right to do that. . . ."
Representative Tom Coburn (R-OK) took the gloves off, making
it clear that the real objective was to condemn homosexuality:
We have heard a lot tonight. We heard a lot in the debate on the rule
about discrimination. We just heard about family values. I do not think
it is about any of those things. The real debate is about homosexuality and
whether or not we sanction homosexuality in this country.319
Representative Canady, a chief sponsor, agreed. "That is what is
at stake here: Should the law express its neutrality between het-
erosexual and homosexual relationships? Should the law elevate
homosexual unions to the same status as the heterosexual rela-
tionships on which the traditional family is based? . . ."32 Citing
"s May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 236 (cited in note 272) (statement
of Representative Inglis).
"6 Id at 236-27 (statement of Representative Inglis).
"1 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7494 (cited in note 273) (reprinting of
Florence King, The Misanthrope's Corner, National Review, June 3, 1996).
"' The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary on S 1740,
104th Cong, 2d Sess 12-13 (1996) (statement of Senator Nickles) ("July 11, 1996
Hearing").
319 July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7444 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Coburn) (emphasis added).
3o Id at H7447 (statement of Representative Canady).
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the work of the Family Research Council, one House member
asserted that all cultures discourage homosexuality "because it is
inherently wrong and harmful to individuals, families, and soci-
eties."32 ' Another said that same-sex marriage would "legitimize
unnatural and immoral behavior."3 2 2 "I Two men loving each other
does not hurt anybody else's marriage," said Representative Hyde,
"but it demeans, it lowers the concept of marriage by making it
something that it should not be and is not, celebrating conduct
that is not approved by the majority of the people."3 23
Representative Coburn reported his constituents' views on ho-
mosexuality, which he said derived from biblical sources:
I come from a district in Oklahoma who [sic] has very profound beliefs
that homosexuality is wrong. I represent that district. They base that
belief on what they believe God says about homosexuality. . . What
they believe is, is that homosexuality is based on perversion, that it is
based on lust . .. it is discrimination towards the [homosexual] act, not
toward the [homosexual] individuals.32 4
As Cleburne made clear, the government cannot act to satisfy con-
stituents' animosity toward a group. Their irrational fears, ste-
reotypes, and unsubstantiated assertions are no more permissible
grounds for inflicting injury on a group than is legislators' own
personal malice toward the group.
The distinction between the "act" and the "individual" cited by
DOMA supporters is a common refrain in condemnations of ho-
mosexuality, and was echoed in Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer.
But the distinction fuels general condemnations of homosexual
persons, just as Lawrence recognized that a homosexual conduct
law stimulates prejudice in the public and private spheres toward
homosexual persons. Coburn alluded to "studies" that he said
found that 43 percent of all homosexuals had more than 500 sexual
partners during their lives. Yet the studies reporting hyper-prom-
321 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7487 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Funderburk).
3 Id at H7494 (statement of Representative Smith).
323 Id at H7501 (statement of Representative Hyde).




iscuity among gay men have been debunked as junk science, 325 and
at any rate do not even purport to make claims about the sexual
practices of lesbians.
In a debate ostensibly about federal recognition of marriage,
homosexual sex was never far from the congressional mind. "The
homosexual movement has been very successful in intimidating
the psychiatric profession. Now people who object to sodomy, to
two men penetrating each other are homophobic," said Repre-
sentative Hyde. "They have the phobia, not the people doing this
act. That is a magnificent accomplishment for public relations. 326
Members openly and cavalierly disparaged gay parents and their
families. Gay couples were not good parents, many members sug-
gested, and "do not make strong families.. .. No society has ever
granted same-sex unions the same kind of official recognition
granted to marriages, and for good reason." 327 "If same-sex mar-
riage is accepted," said Senator Robert Byrd (D-VV), "America
will have said that children do not need a mother and a father,
two mothers or two fathers will be just as good. This would be a
catastrophe." 328 Not content to be the Senate's self-appointed his-
torian, Byrd also took on the mantle of Senate sociologist by
asserting that in gay relationships "emotional bonding oftentimes
does not take place." 329 There was absolutely no basis for this bald
assertion and insult to same-sex couples. Nor did Byrd even at-
tempt to offer one. Senator Trent Lott (R-MI) suggested that gay
relationships were not valuable to society, but were merely "a living
arrangement of two persons of the same sex."o30 This unfounded
characterization demeaned the committed relationships of same-
325 Eugene Volokh, The Myth of the Median Hyper-Promiscuous Gay Male, The Volokh
Conspiracy (May 22, 2003), online at http://www.volokh.com/2003 05_18_vo-
lokh-archive.html#200329250. Even if the myth were fact, it's not clear why gay-male
promiscuity would be relevant to whether same-sex marriages should be permitted, es-
pecially for lesbian couples. See Dale Carpenter, The Traditionalist Case: The Contagious-
Promiscuity Argument, The Volokh Conspiracy (Nov 2, 2005), available online at http://
www.volokh.com/posts/1 130971386.shtml.
326 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7501 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Hyde).
327 Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10117 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Faircloth).
321 Id at S 10111 (statement of Senator Byrd).
321 Id at S10108 (statement of Senator Byrd).
330 Id at S10101 (statement of Senator Lott).
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sex couples. Reliance on unsubstantiated fears and stereotypes is
evidence of animus.
Members of Congress all but claimed that God himself de-
manded the passage of DOMA because they said the Bible con-
demned homosexuality."' "Permit me to be theological and phil-
osophical, for a moment," said one. "I believe that as a people, as
a people [sic], as a God-fearing people, at times, that there are
what are viewed, what I believe are called depraved judgments by
people in our society," he observed. "They come in all forms of
sin." Momentarily lapsing into King James English, he intoned
that "God breatheth light into the face of chaos" and "shineth the
light into our face." He continued:
We as legislators and leaders for the country are in the midst of a chaos,
an attack upon God's principles. God laid down that one man and one
woman is a legal union. That is marriage, known for thousands of years.
That God-given principle is under attack. It is under attack. There are
those in our society that try to shift us away from a society based on
religious principles to humanistic principles; that the human being can
do whatever they want, as long as it feels good and does not hurt
others.33 2
Representatives repeated the baseless historical claim that ho-
mosexuality had destroyed any society that tolerated it:
We hear about diversity, but we do not hear about perversity, and I
think that we should not be afraid to talk about the very issues that are
at the core of this. . . . The fact is, no society that has lived through
the transition to homosexuality and the perversion which it lives and
what it brought forth.'
Another representative concurred that "no culture that has ever
embraced homosexuality has ever survived.""' Representative Bob
Barr (R-GA) was especially florid in his depiction of modern-day
America as a place where "Rome burned, Nero fiddled":
"' "Let us defend the oldest institution, the institution of marriage between male and
female, as set forth in the Holy Bible." Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10111
(cited in note 274) (statement of Senator Byrd). Whether sentiments of this kind might
in some circumstances offend Establishment Clause principles is beyond the scope of this
article.
332 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7486 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Buyer).
.July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7444 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Coburn).




The very foundations of our society are in danger of being burned.
The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames of self-
centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our society:
the family unit. . . . What more does it take, my colleagues, to wake
up and see that this is an issue being shouted at us by extremists intent,
bent on forcing a tortured view of morality on the rest of the country?...
Senator Byrd drew similar lessons from ancient Greece and Rome,
which he said were societies that declined because they had "waxed
casual" about the uniqueness and importance of marriage."' He
then chronicled the same-sex loves of the ancients, including
Achilles and Patroclus, Catiline and his male lover, Julius Caesar
and King Nicomedes, Nero and Sporus. Nero took Sporus to
resorts in Greece and Italy, he remarked, "many a time, sweetly
kissing him."" All of this was to note that same-sex marriage
"make[s] a mockery" of marriage."
Demonizing a group of people is a classic indication of animus
against them. Gay-marriage advocates were condemned as "ho-
mosexual extremists" forming "[e]xtremist homosexual groups"
and pushing "bizarre social experimentation upon unwilling par-
ticipants.""' Gay marriage was the product of "a radical element,
a homosexual agenda that wants to redefine what marriage is,"
said Representative Steve Largent (R-OK).'" Advocates' desire to
formalize their love and commitment to each other was dismissed:
"To them marriage means just two people living together alone.
Is that not sweet? In other words, it means absolutely nothing."34 1
Senator Helms claimed that "inch by inch, little by little, the
homosexual lobby has chipped away at the moral stamina of some
of America's courts and some legislators."3 42 Senator Byrd agreed.
"The drive for same-sex marriage is, in effect, an effort to make
a sneak attack on society by encoding this aberrant behavior in
"s July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7482 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Barr).
"' Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10109 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Byrd).
33 Id.
"' Id at S10110.
336 May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 74-75 (cited in note 272) (statement
of Representative Whyman).
*July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7443 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Largent).
3' Id at H7445 (statement of Representative Barr).
34 Helms's Remarks, 142 Cong Rec at S10068 (cited in note 312).
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legal form before society itself has decided it should be legal," he
warned.343
Overblown assertions about wealthy and privileged homosexuals
also infected the debate. The efforts of gays for equal rights could
not be compared to black civil rights struggles, one representative
averred, because "homosexuals, by most studies that I'm aware of,
have a higher standard of living than heterosexuals."3" He did not
mention what "studies" he had in mind. Without support, he also
asserted that "it is obviously a choice to be homosexual."34 s
A particular fear of DOMA supporters was the effect that rec-
ognition might have on children and what they are taught in
schools. The subtext was the blood libel of anti-gay rhetoric that
homosexuals molest and "recruit" children. "I can't even imagine
all the ramifications that that would have," said one state repre-
sentative from Colorado. "What about the education of our chil-
dren? What about health education? What about Madison Ave-
nue? What about advertising?" she continued, as if gay advocates
were going to convert children through slick marketing cam-
paigns.34 Representative Canady wondered whether children
should be taught that it doesn't matter whether "they establish
families with a partner of the opposite sex or cohabit with someone
of the same sex," that "there is no moral difference between ho-
mosexual relationships and heterosexual relationships," and that
"the parties to a homosexual union" are entitled to equal "rights
and benefits and privileges"?347 The implication was that, given a
slight nudge, children might decide to be homosexual.4
Relatedly, another representative claimed that the same activists
supporting gay marriage were also suing the Boy Scouts for dis-
crimination under laws granting homosexuals "special rights."
They wanted to "place young boys under homosexual men on
341 Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10110 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Byrd).
' May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 236 (cited in note 272) (statement
of Representative Inglis).
345 Id.
31 Id at 61 (statement of Representative Musgrave).
3 July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7447 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Canady).
34 For a discussion of the constitutional implications of these fears, particularly in the
context of DOMA, see Clifford J. Rosky, Fear ofa Queer Child, 61 Buff L Rev 607, 608
(2013); and Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children's Right to Be Queer, 35 Cardozo
L Rev 425, 448 (2013).
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camping trips.""' The image was a dog whistle evoking the out-
rageous and baseless stereotype of gay men as child predators.
Slippery-slope arguments were deployed to warn that the legal
recognition of same-sex relationships would lead to legalizing in-
cest and bestiality, among other things. The effect was dehuman-
izing. The redefinition of marriage "does not even have to be
limited to human beings, by the way. I mean it could be any-
thing."so "How could we stop" at the recognition of same-sex
marriages "and say it should not also include two men and one
woman, or three men, four men, or an adult and a child?""' Rep-
resentative Bob Dornan (R-CA) was incredulous that "we would
ever be discussing homosexuals have the same rights as the sac-
rament of holy matrimony." He predicted that "within 3 or 4 years
we are going to be discussing pedophilia only for males."352
ii) Passive malice: Beyond the numerous expressions of active
malice, there was evidence of what might be called passive malice
in the debate over DOMA. Congress failed even to consider the
interests of future married gay couples when it passed DOMA. It
conducted no study of these effects. No supporter of DOMA even
mentioned a possible impact on gay couples. As Koppelman notes:
"Congress was not thinking about solving a policy problem at all,
and it certainly was not thinking about the actual human beings
whom this law was going to injure. It lashed out at gay people for
the sake of pure political posturing." 3 DOA "reflects the fan-
tasy, unfortunately quite common, that gay people can be wished
out of existence."3"' The failure to consider the needs of a group
burdened by the law was a serious failure of the political process
that should have been expected given the subject matter-marriage
and homosexuality.
It's not that nobody in Congress saw the extensive denial of rights
.. July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7487 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Funderburk).
350 July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7443 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Largent).
35' July 11, 1996 Debate 1, 142 Cong Rec at H7276 (cited in note 276) (statement of
Representative Largent).
352 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7489 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Dornan).
3s3 Koppelman, Why Scalia Sbould Have Voted to Overturn DOMA at 143 (cited in note
4).
354 Id at 145.
4]
274 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
and benefits that would be denied validly married couples. Op-
ponents of DOMA noted that gay couples would lose
Federal retirement benefits, health benefits under Federal programs,
Federal housing benefits, burial rights, privilege against testifying
against [a] partner in Federal trials, visitation rights at hospitals by
partners, rights to family and medical leave to care for a partner, and
many more programs which allow special rights to spouses."'
Representative Steve Gunderson (R-WI) cited letters from con-
stituents who, among other deprivations and indignities, had been
denied access to their partners dying in federally funded hospitals.
He recounted the story of a friend who had recently lost his part-
ner of sixteen years to AIDS. While the hospital allowed him to
visit the dying partner, the funeral home refused to allow him to
sign the formal documents or make funeral arrangements. "The
debate fails to recognize the painful reality thrown on many in-
nocent people who happen to be in long-term relationships outside
of marriage," Representative Gunderson said."' Others cited sim-
ilar practical problems faced by same-sex couples."' Nobody re-
sponded.
In fact, the striking thing about the entire congressional debate
is that supporters of DOMA did not respond at all to these con-
cerns. It's as if the concerns did not register as real human needs.
To the extent legislators mentioned federal rights and benefits at
all, it was only to complain that married gay couples were going
to cost the government some unspecified and unstudied amount
of money."' One representative remarked that his constituents
were "outraged that their tax money could be spent paying vet-
eran's benefits or Social Security based on the recognition of same-
sex marriages.""' A House co-sponsor said it would be irrespon-
sible "to throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury to be raided
by the homosexual movement. 360
sJuly 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7481 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Mink).
"56 Id at H7492 (statement of Representative Gunderson).
3s' July 11, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 11 (cited in note 318) (statement of
Senator Simon).
I" July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7484 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Sensenbrenner).
Id at H7487 (statement of Representative Funderburk).
so Id at H7488 (statement of Representative Barr).
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Some members seemed annoyed at even having to consider the
issue. "It is amazing to me . . . and disturbing that this debate
should even be necessary,"' said Senator Coats. Right before the
vote, Senator Nickles declared it was "almost absurd" that Con-
gress would have to act.362 He was even perturbed that gay spouses
might be entitled to take time off to care for each other under
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.6 The best course,
sponsors said, was to legislate now and study the problem later.
"It seems to me that the wise and prudent thing to do ... is to
keep the law the way it is now, and if there are any changes that
are necessary . . . let the Congress deal with it legislatively, after
hearings, where we know what we're doing and we know the
financial impact it will have."" Congress was advised it should
act before it knew what it was doing. Like the Queen of Hearts
in Alice in Wonderland, Congress would have the "sentence first,
verdict afterwards."
The House rejection of any attempt to study or consider the
needs of gay families led Representative Gunderson to the fol-
lowing conclusion:
Unfortunately, this action exposes those who advance this legislation
for their real goals. There is no sincere attempt to simply reaffirm
marriage. There is certainly no attempt to respond to legitimate and
real issues facing many Americans in 1996. There is, unfortunately,
every attempt to pursue a mean, political-wedge issue at the expense
of the gay and lesbian community in this country. 6 s
iii) Other motives: Not all of the stated aims of DOMA sounded
in animus against gay couples. Indeed, the vast majority of mem-
bers who spoke in committees and on the floor of the House and
Senate cited several reasons for supporting DOMA. Some spon-
sors of the bill, for example, saw Section 2 of DOMA as a defense
of states' rights to determine their own marriage policy-that is,
" Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S 10114 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Coats).
3 Defense of Marriage Act-Rolcall Vote No 280 Leg, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong
Rec S10129 (1996) (statement of Senator Nickles).
" Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10103 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Nickles).
364 Markup Session, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 40 (cited in note 275) (statement of Rep-
resentative Sensenbrenner).
36 July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7493 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Gunderson).
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to prevent the "nationalization" of same-sex marriage.' But oth-
ers asserted that while states should have their own power over
marriage, "[t]he larger issue" was protecting "traditional family
values.""' Appeals to "tradition" were common,168 as were con-
demnations of judicial activism. Many members celebrated the
superior skills of opposite-sex parents. "Children do best in a fam-
ily with a mom and a dad," asserted Representative Tom DeLay
(R-TX),16' although neither he nor others offered a plausible ac-
count of how federal recognition of valid same-sex marriages
would make opposite-sex parents less successful.
It is far from clear that every legislator who voted for DOMA
did so as a way to injure gay couples, or that every legislator was
unconcerned that such injury would be the necessary by-product
of the law. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), who supported
DOMA mainly as a way to protect states' power to decide the
issue for themselves, was a notable exception to the rule of ma-
lignity. Her speech on the Senate floor was pained and humane:
[N]o purpose is served by abandoning civility and a respect for differing
viewpoints in the process. Nor should we forget that at the heart of
the debate over homosexuality are individual Americans. An abstract
subject takes on different dimensions when given the face of a friend,
a family member, a coworker. The things we all hold dear-family,
friendships, a job, a home-present a unique set of challenges for the
gay community. It should come as little surprise that, like anyone else,
gay men and women would like to live their lives without being defined
only by their sexual orientation.3 7 o
She seemed implicitly to rebuke her colleagues for their strident
tone:
Congress is not the ideal forum for the resolution of these issues, nor
will any piece of legislation settle them. However, the tone we set in
our deliberations is one which will be echoed around kitchen tables
and worksites throughout the Nation. Let that tone be one which hon-
May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 32 (cited in note 272) (statement of
Representative Sensenbrenner).
"I July 11, 1996 Debate II, 142 Cong Rec at H7449 (cited in note 302) (statement of
Representative Packard).
July 12, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at H7485 (cited in note 273) (statement of
Representative Seastrand).
3' Id at H7487 (statement of Representative DeLay).




ors our democratic traditions of reasoned debate, responsible decision-
making, and respect for all individuals."'
Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ), who voted for DOMA, expressed
anguish. "I wish I did not have to deal with this issue," he said.
"It makes me feel uncomfortable. I feel I'm on ground full of
quicksand."372 He explained that he supported civil rights for gay
people in housing and employment, and that he did not believe
homosexual orientation was chosen. But given that marriage was
so heavily intertwined with religious belief, he advised "we need
to proceed cautiously." He believed there should be some way to
accommodate the legitimate needs of gay couples, but marriage
should not be redefined "at this time.""' Perhaps Senator Bradley
and others who wanted a "go slow" approach were overly cautious,
and DOMA was a massive overreaction even if caution was war-
ranted, but caution alone is not malice.
In fact, as usual, most legislators said nothing in hearings or on
the floor. No doubt many of them sat glumly, assenting silently
to passage of DOMA not out of anti-gay bias but because they
feared a "no" vote would imperil their political careers. In fact,
the evidence suggests that some legislators privately opposed
DOMA but voted for it anyway for fear of the political conse-
quences."' This may be cowardice, but cowardice is not animus.
Yet the anti-animus doctrine does not permit legislators to hide
behind the prejudices of constituents. They may not be able to
control private prejudices but neither may they give them effect."s
That much was made explicit in Cleburne, which denied the power
of a zoning commission to decide variances based on the unrea-
soning fears and prejudices of a neighborhood."'
It is not the case that every legislator who backed DOMA did
so for essentially bigoted reasons, much less that every pro-DOMA
" Id.
372 Id at S10124 (statement of Senator Bradley).
" Id at S10125.
3 Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA) revealed that some of his colleagues had told him they
were uncomfortable with DOMA but voted for it because "the political consequences are
too great to oppose it." Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10122 (cited in note
274). Others, he added, had told him "that they intend to discriminate, but they believe
that discrimination here is acceptable" because they believe "homosexuality is morally
wrong." Id.
"' Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433 (1984).
376 See Section II.A.2.
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legislator was an anti-gay bigot. But unanimity of malicious pur-
pose is not, and cannot be, the standard for finding unconstitu-
tional animus. It is enough that animus materially influenced the
result. Enough has been said to demonstrate that animus-in both
its active and more passive forms-materially influenced the pas-
sage of this major legislative reform.
Investigating legislative history is a hazardous business. It's pos-
sible simply to cherry-pick the evidence that supports one's con-
clusion (in this case, the conclusion that animus was a material
influence in passage of the law) and ignore or downplay the rest.
The mere presence of fear or "negative attitudes" among some
legislators is not reason enough to strike down a law, the Court
has held."' As Judge Posner has written, "scattered comments of
a vindictive nature in a legislative history" do not prove animus."'
But the expressions of outrage and hysterical fear that accom-
panied Congress's consideration of DOMA were not isolated ut-
terances. They dominated the debate. At the very least, they dem-
onstrate that animus (as the Court defines it) materially influenced
the passage of DOMA. Finding this evidence is not picking out
thorns in a field of strawberries. On DOMA, the Congressional
Record is a field of thorns. No wonder President Clinton, at the
very moment he signed DOMA, urged citizens not to use it as a
justification for violence and discrimination against gay people."
In the view of DOMA's supporters, gay marriage was a hedonistic,
self-centered, Sybaritic indulgence. In their view, it was champi-
oned by the depraved, dangerous to innocent children, damned
by God, and causing chaos in the land. It served no worthwhile
purpose. It had nothing to do with love, commitment, or respon-
sibility. It was not a response to human needs for understanding
and family. It destroyed nations, ancient institutions, and whole
moral codes.
Caroline Products recognized that prejudice toward a group of
people tends to deform the political process that can ordinarily
be relied upon to protect their interests and rights. It inhibits
rational thought and deliberation. As the campaign to pass DOMA
1" Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 357 (2001).
"' Milner v Apfel, 148 F3d 812, 817 (7th Cir 1998).
"' Geidner, Becoming Law (cited in note 40).
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amply demonstrated, gay couples were sinners in the hands of an
angry legislature.
4. Effects. If all that we had as evidence of animus was state-
ments by intemperate members of Congress aroused by the pas-
sions of a passing moment, the Court should resist invalidating
legislation on the grounds that it reflected impermissible animus.
Anti-animus doctrine is a not a rule of good manners and decorum
for congressional debate. It does not police politeness. The Court
has been clear that evidence of animus must also be found in the
actual injury (tangible or dignitary) inflicted on the targets of mal-
ice. In the case of DOMA, that evidence is abundant. Indeed, no
knowledgeable observer can deny the massive effects of the law.
Like Amendment 2 in Romer, the consequences of DOMA were
far-reaching. To supporters of both measures, that effect was the
very point.
Congress's failure to consider the interests of married same-sex
couples is especially glaring in light of the broad impact the law
threatened. As noted, DOMA imposed cradle-to-grave harm on
gay families: from humiliating the children of married gay couples
to the denial of shared cemetery plots. The broad scope of the
law was not denied by anyone on either side of the debate. Sup-
porters of DOMA acknowledged that the word "marriage" ap-
peared approximately 800 times in the United States Code and
that the word "spouse" appeared more than three thousand
times."so Andrew Koppelman summarized some of the major ef-
fects of DOMA on married same-sex couples:
Same-sex spouses could not file joint tax returns. Pretax dollars could
not be used to pay for health insurance or healthcare expenses for a
same-sex spouse or that spouse's dependent children. Same-sex spouses'
debts incurred under divorce decrees or separation agreements were
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Same-sex spouses of federal employees
were excluded from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,
the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Program, and the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act, which compensates the widow or wid-
ower of an employee killed in the performance of duty. Same-sex
spouses were the only surviving widows and widowers who would not
have automatic ownership rights in a copyrighted work after the au-
thor's death. Same-sex spouses were denied preferential treatment un-
der immigration law and, therefore, were the only legally married
38n May 15, 1996 Hearing, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 32 (cited in note 272) (statement of
Representative Sensenbrenner).
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spouses of American citizens who faced deportation. It is a federal crime
to assault, kidnap, or kill a member of the immediate family of a federal
official in order to influence or retaliate against that official-but it was
not if you did that to a same-sex spouse. With the end of the exclusion
of gay people from the military, DOMA made it official policy to with-
hold any survivor's benefits from the surviving spouse of a soldier killed
in the line of duty."'
Even this list does not begin to exhaust the over one thousand
disabilities placed on valid same-sex marriages.' The impact was
so massive and inescapable that injury to married same-sex couples
was not merely incidental to DOMA; it was the object of the law.
The fact that the injury was not merely incidental is another in-
dicator that animus was present.
It should be noted that in some ways DOMA actually benefited
married same-sex couples in comparison to their married opposite-
sex friends. Marriage imposes legal responsibilities in addition to
conferring benefits and protections. Under DOMA, married gay
couples could evade the federal "marriage penalty" under which
some of them would have had to pay higher income taxes. Their
income tax burden was actually lower than similarly situated op-
posite-sex couples. Federal employees could also avoid ethics rules
dealing with spousal financial interests and gifts to a spouse. They
could qualify for more federal student aid because a spouse's in-
come would not count toward eligibility. The Court itself noted
some of these unanticipated consequences of DOMA."'
It's clear that Congress was not trying to help gay couples in
any way. And the net effect, in both practical and dignitary terms,
was overwhelmingly to hurt gay families united in marriage. But
Congress did alleviate some of the responsibilities that same-sex
couples "would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force.""'
In its blind effort to strike at gay couples, Congress actually dis-
favored opposite-sex marriages in some ways and impaired federal
interests. The expressive animus in DOMA overwhelmed practical
"' Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn DOMA at 139 (cited in note
4).
382 In the animus section of its opinion, the Court offered its own partial list of the
disadvantages that DOMA imposed on same-sex marriages. Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2694-
95 (listing Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, veterans' benefits,
healthcare, and bankruptcy). From this, it concluded that the "principal purpose was to
impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency." Id at 2694.




considerations. That, too, suggests a legislative process driven sub-
stantially by animus.ss
5. Pretext. Even extraordinary and far-reaching laws can be jus-
tified by the ultimate objectives they serve. But a law that poorly
serves its stated objectives, or that is wildly over- or underinclusive
in relation to that objective, is open to the suspicion that claimed
objectives are a mere pretext for animus against those injured by
the law. That was the case in Moreno, where Congress's purposes
in the Food Stamp Act were not at all served by the exclusion of
nontraditional family-living arrangements. It was true in Cleburne,
where claimed concern about legal liability, parking, the possibility
of a 500-year flood, and so on, were not sufficient reasons for
rejecting a home for the cognitively disabled while allowing multi-
unit dwellings for nursing homes, fraternities, and sororities.
Given the stated concerns of the zoning board, the discrimination
against the group was underinclusive. And it was true in Romer,
where solicitude for the liberties of individual landlords and small
businesses could not justify a sweeping denial of antidiscrimination
protection for homosexuals in every facet of life. Given the state's
claimed interests, the discrimination against gay people was over-
inclusive.
DOMA suffered all three defects: it did not appear to serve
some of Congress's stated objectives at all; it was overinclusive by
denying married gay couples all benefits rather than those that
could be tied to a specific legitimate purpose; and it was under-
inclusive because it treated married gay couples differently from
others who could not or would not meet the traditional expec-
tations of procreation, child-rearing, and lifelong marriage. These
defects were in addition to the constitutionally impermissible ob-
jective of condemning homosexuality on moral grounds,"8 6 which
was either express or implied in several stated aims of DOIA.
The flimsiness of Congress's justifications for Section 3 of
DOMA have been reviewed repeatedly and at length elsewhere
and won't be repeated here."' Three examples should suffice to
I am grateful to Mary Anne Case for making this observation.
38 Windsor, 133 S Ct at 2694; Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 583 (2003).
3" For a consideration of DOMA's means-ends defects, see Note, 117 Harv L Rev at
2696-2700 (cited in note 294); Jon-Peter Kelly, Act ofInfidelity: Why the Defense ofMarriage
Act Is Unfaithful to the Constitution, 7 Cornell J L & Pub Policy 203, 247-49 (1997); Kevin
H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage
Act and Other Laws, 49 Hastings L J 175, 204-14 (1997).
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show how mightily Congress and later the lawyers for BLAG
strove to create the appearance of constitutionally permissible pur-
poses.
a) Fiscal impact. First, as we have seen,' there was no em-
pirical basis for concern about the fiscal impact of failing to pro-
hibit federal recognition of same-sex marriages recognized by the
states. Such marriages might even have produced a small financial
benefit for the federal government.' But since Congress refused
to review the potential costs and benefits, it is hard to know what
the fiscal impact would have been. This was makeweight material.
b) Responsible procreation. A second justification for
DOMA-encouraging "responsible procreation"-had no basis in
reason, experience, or evidence. While legislators like Senator
Byrd invoked the biblical injunction to "be fruitful and multi-
ply,"3"o nobody explained why it should be thought that federal
recognition of already valid same-sex marriages would affect fer-
tility among heterosexual couples. Nor could anyone begin to
explain why the denial of most of the rights associated with mar-
riage-like burial next to a spouse in a veterans' cemetery-would
have any relationship at all to heterosexuals' willingness to pro-
create.
Perhaps the emphasis should be placed on "responsible" in "re-
sponsible procreation." Perhaps legislators thought that if the fed-
eral understanding of marriage encompassed same-sex marriages
validated in the states, heterosexuals might take marriage less se-
riously, be less likely to marry, and might begin to procreate even
more than they do now outside of marriage. Illegitimacy rates
might rise, with harmful consequences for children. Married ho-
mosexual couples might spoil marriage for everyone else. They
might contaminate it. As Representative Barney Frank (D-MA)
put it during the DOMA debate: "Is there some emanation that
is given off [from gay marriage] that ruins it for you? Gee, Hawaii
is pretty far away. Will not the ocean stop it?"39 1
To believe that the federal recognition of same-sex marriages
". See Section Lll.B.3.b.
" See Letter and Report from Douglas Holtz-Eakin (cited in note 281).
9 Sept 10, 1996 Debate, 142 Cong Rec at S10109 (cited in note 274) (statement of
Senator Byrd).




(which the federal government was not banning) would destroy
the institution of marriage was to believe that homosexuals had a
superhuman corrosive power. It was a power far beyond their
paltry numbers. It was to indulge stereotypes that gay men and
lesbians ruin everything they touch or might be allowed to par-
ticipate in, whether it was federal employment, the military, the
church, or marriage. The fear was so far-fetched, so baseless, and
ultimately so hysterical, that it was in fact another expression of
malice.
c) Cautious and incremental reform. A third reason for en-
acting DOMA might be that society should move slowly and in-
crementally in accepting a change in the understanding of some-
thing as important as marriage. Perhaps we should await evidence
of the effects of allowing same-sex couples to wed before fully
endorsing the change. Congress did not stop states from experi-
menting with marriage, it simply applied the brakes to national
acceptance of it. In general, a preference for slow and incremental
reform is not animus-based. It is a matter of prudence.
Nevertheless, the asserted go-slow purpose does not save
DOMA from invalidation. To begin with, in our federal system,
it is not traditionally Congress's role to decide whether and at
what pace to experiment with marital-status determinations.
DOMA did not, and Congress could not, stop the states from
moving at whatever pace they deemed appropriate for recognizing
same-sex marriages. To the extent that Congress was trying to
apply the brakes to state determinations of marital status, its action
departed from the tradition of federalism in family law. To the
extent Congress was trying to slow down federal acceptance of
same-sex marriage, it must be asked why it decided to move slowly
on this change in marriage rather than on one of the many other
fundamental changes to marriage enacted by the states over the
past century. This was a selectively cautious Congress.
Also, Congress did not allow for incremental, partial, or cautious
changes in federal recognition of same-sex marriages. It denied
all federal recognition for all purposes, without any consideration
of a special need to move slowly in specific contexts. Whatever
else may be said of the process that produced DOMA in the sum-
mer of 1996, caution and careful deliberation were not evident.
Finally, even if a preference for moving cautiously on marital
reform was genuinely one purpose behind DOMA, that does not
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preclude a determination that animus was also a purpose behind
the law. Given the many indicia of animus in DOMA, a desire to
injure and disparage married same-sex couples materially influ-
enced passage regardless of whether prudence might also have
been a motivation.
If legislators had to advert to justifications about financial sav-
ings, responsible procreation, and "caution," they were scrounging
for reasons that might make DOMA sound benevolent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Animus analysis is successfully doing the work that argu-
ments for heightened scrutiny have failed to do in equal protection
cases challenging anti-gay discrimination. Historical experience,
and now two major Supreme Court decisions, support the infer-
ence that anti-gay discrimination will often be animus-based. But
the Court's decision does not necessarily condemn all laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples. The animus holding in Windsor
is so closely tied to federalism concerns that it is not obvious the
Court would come to the same conclusion about a state law de-
fining marriage as one man and one woman.39 2
As the Court argued in the important concluding section of the
opinion, there was unconstitutional "animus" behind DOMA,
which itself is an impermissible legislative purpose and a breach
of the government's duty to treat every individual as though he
possessed some worth represented by the word "dignity." The
government failed even to consider the interests of future married
gay couples when it passed DOMA; to the extent it did so, it acted
to disparage and injure their marriages. And federalism principles,
by assisting the states in protecting the substantive liberties of
their own citizens, by limiting the reach and substance of federal
legislation frustrating the implementation of state policy on family
relations, and by confirming a historical practice from which
DOMA dramatically and suspiciously departed, supported the
conclusion that equal protection was denied. As Justice Jackson
once wrote, equality structurally protects liberty because it means
392 The district court in Kitchen v Herbert, 2013 WL 6697874, 24, 30 (D Utah), holding
the Utah ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, expressly declined to rely on animus.
In Jackson v Abercrombie, 884 F Supp 2d 1065, 1092 (D Hawaii 2012), the district court
held that Hawaii's marriage law could be justified as a way to protect tradition, which is
not the same as animus.
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that the majority can't impose on some what it would not impose
upon itself."' Windsor Products is what happened when Carolene
Products, the advance of gay rights, and the federalism revolution
converged.
Rather than relying on formal tiers of scrutiny, verbal formu-
lations that measure the strength of state interests and narrowness
of means, and tests for what constitutes a discrete and insular
minority, Windsor Products is a guide to the underlying consti-
tutional legitimacy of governmental decision making. It is agnostic
about who might next benefit from judicial policing of animus-
based action. There is no single, predetermined list of groups that
benefit from its judicial vigilance. The beneficiaries of judicial
protection have been food-stamp users, disabled persons, gay men
and lesbians, and married couples.
Our constitutional tradition holds that we're better off in a
republic where there are some things a majority can't do to a
person, including treat the person maliciously, and where the gov-
ernment knows there will be someone occasionally enforcing the
idea that there are some things it cannot do to a person. Under
Windsor Products, this salutary possibility of correction extends as
much to a decision-making process driven by animus as it does
to substantive outcomes denying constitutional rights.
.. Railway Express Agency v New York, 336 US 106, 466-67 (Jackson, J, concurring).
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